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INTRODUCTION
The United States is now negotiating its most important bilateral
investment treaty (“BIT”) to date, a BIT with China.1 In July 2013,
the two States made the “[b]reakthrough [a]nnouncement” that these
negotiations would begin.2 Since then, former officials from both
States have touted the benefits of this treaty, stating that it will
“unleash far more investment in both directions,” move China toward
a balanced, service-based economy, and infuse capital into the US
economy to spur growth.3
The treaty will also mean more work for lawyers, particularly
those lawyers defending the United States and China in investment
arbitrations brought by investors of the other State. As the United
States has learned in its experience with the North American Free
Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”), the inclusion of investor-State dispute
settlement provisions in an investment agreement will inevitably lead
to the initiation of investment arbitration proceedings, and if nationals
of the US treaty partner have investments in the United States, those
arbitrations will be filed against the United States.4 Indeed, precisely
this has been the result in the years following the conclusion of the
NAFTA. The United States and Canada have faced 34 arbitrations
between each other, a consequence wholly unforeseen by the
1. For general background on the bilateral investment (“BIT”) policies of China and the
United States, as well as anticipated areas of disagreement in the US-China BIT negotiations,
see W.H. Maruyama, J.T. Stoel & C.B. Rosenberg, Negotiating the US-China Bilateral
Investment Treaty: Investment Issues and Opportunities in the Twenty-First Century, 7(4)
TRANSNAT’L DISP. MGMT. (2010).
2. Betsy Bourasa, US Dep’t of the Treasury, US and China Breakthrough Announcement
on the Bilateral Investment Treaty Negotiations, TREASURY NOTES BLOG (July 15, 2013),
http://www.treasury.gov/connect/blog/Pages/US-and-China-Breakthrough-Announcement-.
aspx.
3. Charlene Barshefsky & Long Yongtu, A Win-Win Possibility for China-US Trade,
WALL ST. J., June 30, 2014.
4. That is, of course, assuming that the treaty includes investor-State dispute settlement.
Such an assumption seems safe because China’s recent agreements have included investorState dispute settlement, and the United States has shown no sign of backing away from its
longstanding policy of supporting investor-State dispute settlement.
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negotiators of either State when deciding to include investor-State
dispute settlement provisions and wholly unavoidable, once the
United States and Canada signed the treaty.5
Chinese investors are already heavily involved in the US
economy,6 and this involvement will only increase with the
conclusion of the US-China BIT.7 Thus, the United States will
inevitably find itself in the coming years acting as a respondent in
investor-State arbitrations brought by Chinese investors under the
forthcoming US-China treaty. US treaty negotiators would be well
advised to ensure that the United States can maintain the desirable
level of regulatory flexibility in this treaty, while still providing the
promised investment protections. Arbitral tribunals, while a useful
mechanism for settling disputes, are notoriously unpredictable and—
for better or worse—tribunals are not bound by precedent.8 Therefore,
5. As one commentator has observed, while the “novelty” of including investor-state
dispute settlement as between the United States and Canada in NAFTA was noted at the time,
“its implications were not fully appreciated.” William S. Dodge, Investor-State Dispute
Settlement Between Developed Countries: Reflections on the Australia-United States Free
Trade Agreement, 39 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1, 16 (2006). This view is confirmed by
numerous statements by US officials at the time investment arbitrations were unfolding against
the United States under NAFTA. See Adam Liptak, Review of US Rulings by NAFTA
Tribunals Stirs Worries, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 2004. Indeed, the US experience as a
respondent in various NAFTA arbitrations shaped the 2004 Model BIT. Lee M. Caplan &
Jeremy K. Sharpe, United States, in SELECTED COMMENTARIES ON MODEL INVESTMENT
TREATIES 756 (Chester Brown ed., 2013). Due to concern that “arbitral tribunals might
misinterpret certain [NAFTA] Chapter 11 obligations that were formulated in minimalist
terms” the United States clarified certain obligations in the 2004 Model BIT which were
previously left undefined. Id.
6. As reported in Business Week, Chinese companies invested US$14 billion in the
United States in 2013, particularly in the areas of food, real estate, and energy. Dexter Roberts,
Chinese Investment in US Doubles to $14 Billion in 2013, BLOOMBERG BUSINESS WEEK (Jan.
8, 2014), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2014-01-08/chinese-investment-into-u-dot-sdot-doubles-to-14-billion-in-2013; see also US Chamber of Commerce, Faces of Chinese
Investment in the United States, available at https://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/
legacy/reports/16983_INTL_FacesChineseInvest_copyright_lr.pdf (last visited August 19,
2014).
7. Future investments would of course be covered by investment treaty protections, and
therefore could form the subject of an investment dispute if affected by host-State measures.
Under the 2012 US Model BIT, investments that predate the treaty are also protected (as
“covered investments”), and could also serve as a basis for an investment dispute, if affected
by host-State measures. See 2012 US Model BIT art. 1, available at http://www.ustr.gov/sites/
default/files/BIT%20text%20for%20ACIEP%20Meeting.pdf. (“‘Covered investment’ means,
with respect to a Party, an investment in its territory of an investor of the other Party in
existence as of the date of entry into force of this Treaty or established, acquired, or expanded
thereafter.”)
8. See Ragnar Harbst et al., Germany, in BAKER & MCKENZIE INTERNATIONAL
YEARBOOK: 2011-2012 196 (2012).

4

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 38:1

the best vehicle to ensure the appropriate level of regulatory
flexibility is the BIT itself, and in particular the inclusion of
exceptions clauses that permit the host State to take certain measures
that otherwise would be in violation of the investment treaty.9 These
clauses—which are treated as a whole in this article as exceptions
clauses—are on the rise in investment treaties generally, and US
negotiators would be wise to follow this trend and consider the
exceptions provided in its BIT with China and the language of those
exceptions.
Much has been written about necessity and related treaty
exceptions with respect to the investment claims against Argentina10
and in the context of the security exception of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade.11 What is lacking, however, is a proposal on the
way forward for US negotiators seeking to set out exceptions clauses
in the BIT with China and other future treaty partners. Such a
proposal may be drawn from the interpretation of necessity in
customary international law by investment tribunals and a
comparative analysis of other States’ approaches to exceptions
clauses in investment treaties. This Article conducts the underlying
analysis and provides such a proposal.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I analyzes necessity under
customary international law and emphasizes the extremely narrow
and questionable nature of this plea and the difficulty of applying it in
investment disputes. Part II describes the evolution of exceptions
clauses in US BIT practice and notes problems with the three
different, disparate types of exceptions clauses in current US BITs.
Part III provides a comparative perspective by describing the
9. Indeed, such a clause would be in line with other provisions of recent model BITs
which reduce the discretion of arbitral tribunals in favor of more State-to-State control of the
standards applied in the arbitral process. For example, the United States has defined the “fair
and equitable treatment” standard according to the customary international law minimum
standard of treatment, and set out that ordinary regulatory measures do not constitute
expropriation. See O. Thomas Johnson & Catherine H. Gibson, The Objections of Developed
and Developing States to Investor-State Dispute Resolution, in CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION: THE FORDHAM PAPERS (Arthur W. Rovine
ed., forthcoming 2014).
10. E.g., Jose E. Alvarez & Tegan Brink, Revising the Necessity Defense: Continental
Casualty v. Argentina, in YEARBOOK ON INT’L INV. LAW & POLICY (Karl P. Sauvant ed.,
2011); William W. Burke-White & Andreas von Staden, Investment Protection in
Extraordinary Times: The Interpretation and Application of Non-Precluded Measures
Provisions in Bilateral Investment Treaties, 48 VA. J. INT’L L. 307 (2008).
11. E.g., Roger P. Alford, The Self-Judging WTO Security Exception, 2011 UTAH L.
REV. 697 (2011).
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exceptions clauses in the BITs of other States, noting the advantages
and disadvantages of these alternative approaches. Part IV suggests a
way forward for the United States in its BIT negotiations, particularly
its negotiation with China, by combining lessons learned from the
weaknesses of existing US BIT exceptions clauses and the advantages
of exceptions clauses from other States.
I. ‘NECESSITY’ IN CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
A current discussion of ‘necessity’ in customary international
law must begin with Article 25 of the Draft Articles on Responsibility
of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (“Draft Articles”) by the
International Law Commission (“ILC”). As discussed below, the
concept of necessity in Article 25 is quite narrow, particularly as
applied and interpreted in the investment context. In addition,
fundamental questions remain regarding the status and availability of
this defense in customary international law generally, and particularly
outside a situation of war.
A. ILC Draft Article 25—Six Requirements
The necessity provision at Article 25 of the ILC Draft Articles
provides:
1. Necessity may not be invoked by a State as a ground for
precluding the wrongfulness of an act not in conformity with an
international obligation of that State unless the act:
(a) is the only way for the State to safeguard an essential
interest against a grave and imminent peril; and
(b) does not seriously impair an essential interest of the
State or States towards which the obligation exists, or of
the international community as a whole.
2. In any case, necessity may not be invoked by a State as a
ground for precluding wrongfulness if:
(a) the international obligation in question excludes the
possibility of invoking necessity; or
(b) the State has contributed to the situation of necessity.12

12. U.N. Int'l Law Comm’n, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts, art. 25, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001).
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As this text makes clear, a State must fulfill six criteria in order
to successfully plead necessity: (1) a threat to an “essential interest”
of a particular State; (2) a “grave and imminent peril” to that interest;
(3) the action taken is the “only way” to preserve that essential
interest; (4) that the situation in question was not caused by the State
seeking to invoke the plea; (5) the State’s action to address the
situation does not impair the interests of other States; and (6) the
action lasts only as long as the situation persists.
The difficulty of applying this provision in investment
arbitrations has been amply demonstrated in the arbitral proceedings
brought against Argentina arising out of the financial crisis it suffered
in the late 1990s.13 In the early 1990s, Argentina sought to attract
foreign investment by, among other measures, privatizing its gas
sector. In so doing, Argentina promised foreign investors certain
benefits, including regular payments calculated in US dollars. When
its financial crisis struck in the late 1990s, Argentina suspended and
ultimately reversed these laws favorable to foreign investors, and
multiple arbitrations were filed, only a fraction of which have been
concluded. In those arbitrations—some of which were filed under the
US-Argentina BIT—Argentina famously invoked necessity under
customary international law to avoid responsibility under the BIT.14
The arbitral panels deciding these cases stirred some controversy by
applying different interpretations of the necessity plea, and, on some
issues, even reaching wholly conflicting decisions. Adding to this
controversy, the annulment committees considering the panel
decisions in the cases against Argentina have reached still different
conclusions regarding the interpretation and application of the plea.
As discussed further below, some of the problems with these
decisions were caused by the fact that the ILC provision is simply
incongruent with the arbitration paradigm.
To excuse or justify an internationally wrongful act with a plea
of necessity, a State must first show that the act it took was in defense

13. See LG&E Energy Corp. v. Arg. Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, Decision on
Liability (Oct. 3, 2006) [hereinafter LG&E Award]; CMS Transmission Co. v. Arg. Republic,
ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Award (May 12, 2005) [hereinafter CMS Award]; Enron Corp.,
Ponderosa Assets, L.P. v. Arg. Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, Award (May 22, 2007)
[hereinafter Enron Award]; Sempra Energy Int’l v. Arg. Republic, Case No. ARB/02/16,
Award (Sept. 28, 2007) [hereinafter Sempra Award].
14. See Alvarez & Brink, supra note 10; see also Burke-White & van Staden, supra note
10 at 314.
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of “an essential interest.”15 An “essential interest” within the meaning
of the ILC Draft Articles, is not limited to preservation of the State
itself, but rather includes also the preservation of the environment16
and food supplies.17 The term is, however, fact-specific: “[t]he extent
to which a given interest is ‘essential’ depends upon all the
circumstances, and cannot be prejudged. It extends to particular
interests of the State and its people, as well as of the international
community as a whole.”18 Indeed, the Argentina cases bear out the
fact-specific nature—and perhaps the tribunal-specific nature—of
what constitutes an “essential interest,” An arbitral panel considering
one of these cases stated that an interest is “essential” if it implicates
the State’s very existence and independence. This panel
acknowledged that Argentina’s financial crisis was “severe” and that
“in such a context it was unlikely that business could have continued
as usual.”19 Ultimately, however, the Tribunal held that Argentina’s
financial crisis did not threaten an essential interest of the State
because “[q]uestions of public order and social unrest could have
been handled, as in fact they were, just as questions of political
stabilization were handled under the constitutional arrangements in
force.”20
A different arbitral panel considering exactly the same Argentine
financial crisis, however, concluded that Argentina had faced a threat
to an essential interest within the meaning of Article 25 of the ILC
Draft Articles. As that panel reasoned, during the financial crisis
15. The International Law Commission (“ILC”) Draft Articles do not state clearly
whether Article 25 constitutes a justification, so that liability does not attach, or an excuse,
such that liability does attach but is excused. See Robert Sloane, On the Use and Abuse of
Necessity in the Law of State Responsibility, 106 AM. J. INT’L L. 447, 482-86 (2012) (noting
the lack of clarity on this point in the ILC Draft Articles and stating that “the effects of
necessity may differ contextually”).
16. The Gab ikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung./Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7 (Sept. 25).
17. R. Ago, Addendum to the Eighth Report on State Responsibility, [1980] Y.B. Int’l L.
Comm’n 13, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1980/Add. 1. Although its exact scope is not clear, the
term essential interest is certainly broader than the “peremptory norms of general international
law” addressed at articles 40 and 41 and thereafter of the ILC Draft Articles. Sarah Heathcote,
Circumstances Precluding Wrongfulness in the ILC Articles on State Responsibility: Necessity,
in OXFORD COMMENTARIES ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY 491, 497 (2010). Articles 40 and 41
obligate States to “cooperate to bring to an end” “a gross or systematic failure by the
responsible State” to fulfill “an obligation arising under a peremptory norm of general
international law.” U.N. Int’l Law Comm’n, supra note 12, at art. 40–41.
18. JAMES CRAWFORD, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION’S ARTICLES ON STATE
RESPONSIBILITY 183 (2002).
19. Sempra Award, supra note 13, ¶ 348.
20. Id.
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Argentina “faced an extremely serious threat to its existence, its
political and economic survival, to the possibility of maintaining its
essential services in operation, and to the preservation of its internal
peace.”21 Interestingly, both panels define an “essential interest” in
the same way, but they reach different conclusions on the facts. Thus,
as the Argentina cases demonstrate, the existence of an essential
interest under Draft Article 25—even when the definition of that term
is agreed—is not a matter of black and white, and different arbitral
panels can reach different decisions on whether the interests at stake
in particular circumstances are “essential.”
Even if an essential interest is at issue, a State seeking to invoke
necessity must also demonstrate that this essential interest was
threatened by grave and imminent peril. Such a showing requires
concrete evidence: “The peril has to be objectively established and
not merely apprehended as possible.”22 However, some preemptive
action is permitted, a fact that distinguishes acts of necessity from acts
of mitigation.23 Thus, “a measure of uncertainty about the future does
not necessarily disqualify a State from invoking necessity, if the peril
is clearly established on the basis of the evidence reasonably available
at the time.”24 In the Argentina cases, however, this factor has been
applied strictly, seemingly allowing very little preemptive action. One
panel, for example, took the view that fulfilling this “peril” factor
would involve a finding that matters were out of control. Thus, the
tribunal held that Argentina had not met the “peril” requirement for
the necessity plea because “[w]hile the [Argentine] Government had a
duty to prevent a worsening of the situation, and could not simply
leave events to follow their own course, there is no convincing
evidence that events were actually out of control or had become
unmanageable.”25
Even if a State has satisfied the “essential interest” and “grave
and imminent peril” factors, the State can successfully plead necessity
under the ILC Draft Articles only if the act in question was the “only
way” to safeguard the essential interest at stake. As stated in the ILC
commentary, “[t]he plea is excluded if there are other (otherwise
21. LG&E Award, supra note 13, ¶ 257.
22. CRAWFORD, supra note 18, at 183.
23. The Gab íkovo–Nagymaros Project (Hung./Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, ¶ 55–56 (Sept.
25).
24. CRAWFORD, supra note 18, at 184.
25. Sempra Award, supra note 13, ¶ 349.

2015]

BEYOND SELF-JUDGMENT

9

lawful) means available” and moreover, “[t]he word ‘way’ . . . is not
limited to unilateral action but may also comprise other forms of
conduct available through cooperative action with other States or
through international organizations.”26
In applying this “only way” factor, investment tribunals
considering the Argentina cases have declined to second-guess
government action in emergency situations.27 Instead, one panel took
a comparative approach and found that Argentina’s action in
addressing its financial crisis was not the “only” way to do so. As this
tribunal reasoned, “[a] rather sad global comparison of experiences in
the handling of economic crises shows that there are always many
approaches to addressing and resolving such critical events” and
therefore the tribunal found it “difficult to justify the position that
only one of them was available in the Argentine case.”28 Under this
analysis, seemingly no State could ever successfully plead necessity
in a financial crisis because economic theory will never offer a single
theory to address a financial crisis.
In addition to the above criteria, which relate to the character
of the action in question, the ILC Draft Articles’ necessity provision
also includes criteria related to the emergency itself and the State’s
other actions. In particular, the State seeking to invoke the plea must
not have contributed to the emergency situation. The inclusion of this
factor—along the lines of a clean-hands requirement—discourages
abuse of the necessity plea by preventing a State from manufacturing
an emergency situation in order to extricate itself from an onerous
international obligation. This is an admirable goal, but as the
Argentina cases have demonstrated the myriad of factors that mix in
unforeseeable ways to form an economic crisis have rendered this
“non-contribution” factor nearly impossible to satisfy in the context
of a financial crisis. As one Argentina panel stated, as to financial
crises in general, “the roots extend both ways and include a number of
domestic as well as international dimensions” as the “unavoidable
consequence of the operation of a global economy where domestic
and international factors interact.”29
In addition to the clean-hands requirement of noncontribution, the ILC’s necessity provision requires a balancing of
26.
27.
28.
29.

CRAWFORD, supra note 18, at 184.
CMS Award, supra note 13, ¶ 323.
Sempra Award, supra note 13, ¶ 350.
CMS Award, supra note 13, ¶ 328.
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interests of other States and the international community as a whole.
Thus, the ILC provision requires that “the interests relied on [by the
State pleading necessity] must outweigh all other considerations, not
merely from the point of view of the acting State, but on a reasonable
assessment of the competing interests, whether these are individual or
collective.”30 When a necessity plea is invoked in State-to-State cases,
this balancing factor reflects the principle of sovereign equality of
nations—one State may not take action to protect its own interests in
a manner that disproportionately harms the interests of other States,
because all States are of equal sovereignty and their interests enjoy
equal importance on the international plane.
In the investor-State context, however, where the principle of
sovereign equality is inapplicable, the proper interpretation of this
balancing factor is unclear. One Argentina panel took a novel
approach to this question—and an approach that makes it extremely
difficult for the responding State to satisfy the requirements for the
necessity plea.31 In applying the balancing-of-interests factor, the
tribunal first considered whether the action compromised the interest
of the other State party to the investment treaty, and then also whether
the action compromised the interest of the investor. Although that
tribunal ultimately concluded that any compromise to other interests
did not preclude Argentina’s invocation of the necessity plea under
the ILC Draft Articles,32 the panel’s consideration of the interests of a

30. CRAWFORD, supra note 18, at 184.
31. The CMS tribunal considered the “other interests” criterion of the ILC Draft Articles
in the context of the non-precluded measures provision of the United States-Argentina BIT,
which Argentina had also invoked in that case. See CMS Award, supra note 13, ¶325. The
annulment committee criticized the panel’s intermingling of these two standards. See CMS
Gas Transmission Co. v. Arg. Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Decision on Annulment,
¶¶ 128–36 (Sept. 25, 2007).
32. As the tribunal stated, “it does not appear that an essential interest of the State to
which the obligation exists has been impaired, nor have those of the international community
as a whole.” CMS Award, supra note 13, ¶ 358. This approach is largely echoed in the Sempra
Award. There, the tribunal stated that “[t]he interest of the international community does not
appear to be in any way impaired in this context, as it is an interest of a general kind.” Sempra
Award, supra note 13, ¶ 352. The Sempra Award tribunal also found that the invocation of the
state of necessity would not impair the interest of the other state-party to the investment treaty.
Sempra Award, supra note 13, ¶ 390. Sempra Award discussed this matter as part of its
analysis of the non-precluded measures clause of the US-Argentina BIT because the tribunal
found that the BIT “did not deal with the elements necessary for the legitimate invocation of a
state of necessity.” Sempra Award, supra note 13, ¶ 378. Like the CMS Award tribunal, the
Sempra Award tribunal also considered the interests of investors because they are “ultimately
the beneficiaries of [investment treaty] obligations.” Sempra Award, supra note 13, ¶ 391. The
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private investor, as well as the interests of the other State party to the
investment treaty, makes it extremely difficult for the State seeking to
invoke necessity to satisfy the customary international law
requirements of that plea. Indeed, an investment will seemingly
always be an “essential interest” to an investor, and the investor’s
decision to initiate an arbitration indicates that this interest has been
compromised—thus, if an investor’s interests are weighed equally
against those of host States, then the host State could satisfy the
necessity plea only when the host State’s action did not negatively
affect the investment—in which case seemingly the host State would
not have violated the investment treaty in the first place.
Finally, a plea of necessity also is limited in time and applies
only so long as the emergency situation persists. In other words “any
conduct going beyond what is strictly necessary for the purpose will
not be covered.”33 This limitation, in contrast to the prior five factors,
actually causes relatively little trouble in investment disputes.
Although it will sometimes be difficult to fix the exact date on which
a situation of “financial emergency” ceases, a reasonableness test
could be applied in these circumstances.
B. Problems with ‘Necessity’ in Investment Cases
As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, the ILC Draft
Articles’ necessity provision is unwieldy in its application to financial
emergencies, as pled in investor-State arbitrations. At least three
problems are presented in the foregoing discussion.
First, arbitral tribunals have been inconsistent in their findings
regarding whether an “essential interest” is at stake when a State is
facing a severe financial crisis. Addressing the exact same financial
crisis and indeed seemingly applying the same standard, tribunals
considering claims against Argentina reached differing conclusions
on whether Argentina was protecting an “essential interest” in the
actions it took in response to its financial crisis. With such
inconsistency in interpretation, a State cannot be sure whether this
provision would be applied in the sense of customary international
law in any given case. Indeed, this finding more than any other,
illustrates the dangers of imprecision in treaty-drafting—with such
tribunal concluded, without analysis, that the essential interest of the claimant investor “would
certainly be seriously impaired by the operation of . . . a state of necessity in this case.” Id.
33. CRAWFORD, supra note 18, at 184.
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imprecision, the treaty parties cannot predict how treaty provisions
will be interpreted, and they cannot even be sure that a single
provision will be given a single, consistent interpretation.
An additional problem is presented by arbitral tribunals’
interpretation of the “only way” and “clean hands” requirements—
interpretations of these requirements make it difficult for any State to
ever successfully plead necessity under customary international law.
As to the “only way” requirement, because economic theory will
always present alternative ways to achieve a certain result (at least
hypothetically), tribunals’ consideration of such hypothetical
alternatives will preclude a finding that certain action is ever excused
or justified by necessity. As to the “clean hands” requirement—that
the State seeking to invoke the necessity plea must not have
contributed to the situation of necessity—arbitral tribunals seem to
have recognized the difficulty that this requirement causes for States,
and therefore have weighed the relative contribution of the State to
the situation of necessity.34
Finally, the application of the balancing factor is difficult in the
investment arbitration context, which presents claims of a private
investor against a State, based on a State-to-State treaty.
Consideration of the investors’ interests in the balancing factor may
be difficult to justify, particularly if the inclusion of this factor in the
ILC draft articles was to reflect principles of sovereign equality.35
Moreover, consideration of the investors’ interests will always
preclude a State from invoking the necessity plea because the
investor’s interests will almost by definition have been
compromised—indeed, an allegation that the investor’s interests have
been injured is precisely the basis for bringing the investment dispute,
and would be the basis of a finding that the host State had violated the
substantive terms of the investment treaty. Traditionally, this
34. The CMS Award panel, for example, weighed the relative contribution of domestic
and international factors to the economic crisis. In this further analysis, the panel concluded
that Argentina had contributed to the economic situation to an extent that precluded it from
invoking the plea of necessity under customary international law. CMS Award, supra note 13,
¶ 329. As the tribunal stated, the crisis “found its roots in the earlier crisis of the 1980s and
evolving governmental policies of the 1990s that reached a zenith in 2002” and therefore
“government policies and their shortcomings significantly contributed to the crisis and the
emergency.” Id. The tribunal was not swayed from this conclusion by the existence of
“exogenous factors” that “fuel[ed] additional difficulties.” Id.
35. And indeed, it is unclear whether such analysis is even appropriate in international
law—one commentator has criticized this factor as “wholly foreign to necessity as understood
in the early law of nations,” Sloane, supra note 15, at 458.
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discussion of the necessity plea under customary international law
occurs in the context of relations between States, not relations
between a State and a private citizen, and the context-specific nature
of the plea is demonstrated by the difficulty of applying its terms in
investment disputes outside the State-to-State context.36
In addition to these problems with the terms of the necessity plea
in customary international law, there remains doubt about the scope and
indeed the very existence of necessity in customary international law,
discussed in the next section.
C. Lingering Controversy
The ILC’s records demonstrate that the necessity provision
was controversial throughout the drafting phases of the Draft Articles.
For example, the Swedish representative acknowledged in 1981 that,
“necessity is recognized, in principle, as an admissible plea,” but
stated that the scope of such a provision was not clearly established so
that “each case will have to be judged individually on the basis of
moral rather than legal considerations.”37 Such calls for fact-specific
determinations were echoed by other ILC representatives throughout
the negotiating process, and do not inspire confidence that a
consensus exists on even the general scope of any such plea.
Particular controversy arose in discussions of using the term
“essential interest” to describe what might give rise to a successful
invocation of the necessity plea. As a representative from Mongolia
stated, “[t]he criterion of an ‘essential interest’ used in the article not
only fails to solve the problem [of vagueness], but may even create
new problems. It is virtually impossible to establish whose interests
are essential when the interests of two States clash.”38 Another
representative similarly noted that “[t]he concept of an essential
interest which a State might invoke to evade its responsibility was
36. Andrea K. Bjorklund, Emergency Expectations: State of Necessity and Force
Majeure, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 459, 463 (Peter
T. Muchlinski, Federico Ortino, & Christoph Schreuer eds., 2008) (“[T]he state of necessity
defence is usually discussed in the classic language of responsibility as between States
themselves. This lack of congruence is evident when tribunals examining a necessity defence
are analy[z]ing the relative interests of a host State and an investor, rather than the relative
interests of the host State and the home State.”).
37. Comments of Governments on part one of the draft articles on State responsibility for
internationally wrongful acts, [1981] 2(1) Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 77, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/342
and Add. 1–4.
38. Id. at 76.
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very subjective. To a State, every one of its interests was essential.”39
Such concerns remain today.
Indeed, even after the ILC’s Draft Articles—including the
necessity provision—were adopted, James Crawford wrote that “[i]t
has been doubted whether necessity exists as an omnibus category.”40
And indeed, these doubts come from diverse and illustrious sources.
As stated in the decision of the Rainbow Warrior arbitration, “there is
no general principle allowing the defence of necessity.”41 Moreover,
as scholars have noted, even if such a plea exists in general
international law, “[t]he limits of defences such as necessity in terms
of customary international law and its application in the investment
context remain to be worked out.”42 Indeed, these Draft Articles
“were drafted to serve general purposes; they were not drafted to
serve the interests of investor-State arbitration, or even of investment
generally.”43
The idea of pleading necessity as an exit for international law
obligations can be traced to Grotius and Vattel, and even further in
history to religious texts.44 Early arbitral decisions conflated necessity
and force majeure, however, and invocations of this plea under
circumstances other than war were generally unsuccessful. In the
39. Draft articles on State responsibility. Texts adopted by the Drafting Committee:
articles 33 to 35 - reproduced in document A/CN.4/SR.1635, paras. 42, 53 and 62, [1980] 1
Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 271, ¶ 48, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.318.
40. James Crawford, BROWNLIE’S PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 564
(Oxford University Press 8th ed. 2012)
41. Fr. v. N.Z., 1990 R.I.A.A. 254, ¶ 78 (Apr. 30).
42. M. Sornarajah, Evolution or Revolution in International Investment Arbitration? The
Descent into Normlessness, in EVOLUTION IN INVESTMENT TREATY LAW AND ARBITRATION
631, 656 (Chester Brown & Kate Miles eds., 2011).
43. Bjorklund, supra note 36, at 522.
44. As one author has noted, “States recognize the need for a residual ‘exit’ mechanism
from legal obligations—the contours of which are as uncertain as the possible contingencies
presumably embraced in the [necessity] doctrine.” Diane A. Desierto, Necessity and National
Emergency Clauses Sovereignty in Modern Treaty Interpretation, in 3 INTERNATIONAL
LITIGATION IN PRACTICE 116 (Loretta Malintoppi & Eduardo Valencia–Ospina eds., 2012).
As Desierto sets out, doctrines of necessity are present in several areas of international law,
including human rights and the law of armed conflict, as well as in international investment
law and international trade law. She suggests that an additional reason to include a necessity
clause in a treaty may be “to prevent abusive or disingenuous invocation of necessity by other
treaty parties.” Id. at 129. By specifically setting out the scope of a necessity defense, this
argument goes, a state may preclude a treaty partner from taking a very broad view of
necessity under customary international law. Id. at 129–30. This alternative rationale for
including a necessity clause is not implausible, but it is also inconsistent with the ILC
definition of necessity, which, in fact, appears quite narrow (and narrower than the necessity
clauses included in investment treaties).
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1912 Russian Indemnities arbitration, for example, Turkey invoked
force majeure and argued that it was not able to repay Russia for
certain loans due to both financial problems and domestic
insurrections.45 Although the tribunal acknowledged “international
law must adapt itself to political necessities,”46 it declined to accept
Turkey’s plea because Turkey had been able to obtain loans and make
other large payments during the relevant time.47
Thereafter a similar plea—with a similar result—was presented
in 1929 in the Brazilian loans case.48 There, the primary question was
whether Brazil was obligated to repay certain amounts to foreign
bondholders in paper francs or gold francs, a question which acquired
particular significance after paper francs suffered significant
depreciation.49 Brazil argued that it faced a situation of force majeure
due to war that should annul, or at least suspend its obligations. The
Permanent Court of International Justice, however, rejected this
argument, reasoning that Brazil’s inability to pay in gold coins did not
preclude payment in another form for the gold value.50 Again,
however, the tribunal did not reject the existence of the plea, but
rather found that its requirements were not satisfied under the facts at
issue.

45. As the tribunal stated:
Turkey was, from 1881 to 1902, in the midst of financial difficulties of the
utmost seriousness, combined with domestic and foreign events (insurrections,
wars) which forced it to make special disposition of a large part of its
revenues, to submit to foreign control a part of its finances, to even grant a
delay in payment to the Ottoman Bank, and, generally, it could satisfy its
obligations only through delay and postponements, and even then at great
sacrifice.
Russ. v. Turk., 11 R.I.A.A. 421 (1912).
46. Id.
47. The tribunal held that, due to Turkey’s ability to meet other financial obligations,
“[i]t would clearly be exaggeration to allow that the payment (or the securing of a loan for the
payment) of the comparatively small sum [at issue in that case] would imperil the existence of
the Ottoman Empire or seriously compromise its internal or external situation .” Id.
48. Braz. v. Fr. 1929 P.C.I.J. (ser. C) No. 16, at 120 (May 27).
49. Id. at 95–96, 100. As the Permanent Court of International Justice (“PCIJ”) noted,
the legal challenge was brought “after the increasing depreciation of the French franc, the
service of the loan was effected in that currency on the basis of its current value, ultimately led
to protests and the taking of steps by the bondholders with a view to inducing the French
Government to intervene.” Id. at 100.
50. Id. at 122–23.
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Other cases in which necessity was invoked to avoid
international obligations follow a similar pattern.51 Thus, even before
the ILC formulated its strict criteria for establishing a necessity plea
in the Draft Articles, international tribunals generally declined to
recognize financial hardship as permitting States to avoid
international obligations. Though these tribunals did generally
acknowledge the existence of such a plea, they construed it narrowly
and simply found that it did not apply to the circumstances before
them. Such a construction of the plea permits States only very limited
flexibility of action in responding to emergency situations.
The cyclical economic trends that affect the burdens imposed on
host States due to investment obligations, however, require reasonable
flexibility in permitting States to respond to emergency situations,
including financial emergencies. As demonstrated above, the
customary international law plea of “necessity” is inadequate to
balance States’ interests in legitimate regulation with protection of
investors. Particularly in recent years, as economic volatility has
increased, States have sought—and needed—additional flexibility in
51. For example, a similar plea was also made and rejected in the Société Commerciale
de Belgique, 1939 P.C.I.J. (ser. C) No. 87 (June 15). Before that case was filed, Belgium had
won an award of 6 million “gold dollars” against Greece based on Greece’s failure to pay as
promised on certain bonds sold to Belgian holders to finance a Greek railway project. Id. at
166–67. When Greece failed to pay this award, Belgium brought a second arbitration. In this
second proceeding, Greece acknowledged that the first award was binding, but argued that “by
reason of its budgetary and monetary situation . . . it is materially impossible for the Greek
Government to execute the awards as formulated” and requested that the Greek Government
and the Belgian entity should “be left to come to some arrangement for the execution of these
awards which will correspond with the budgetary and monetary capacity of the debtor.” Id. at
165. As in the previous arbitrations, Greece’s plea ultimately did not attract the tribunal’s
support. Although the majority acknowledged that a settlement by the two governments
regarding the dispute was “highly desirable,” the majority found that it lacked jurisdiction,
based on the parties’ statements, to rule on Greece’s capacity to pay. Id. This rationale is
unsatisfying and appears to be a rather obvious attempt to sidestep the relevant question.
However, even if the tribunal had taken a broader view of its jurisdiction, the result would
likely have been the same—and Greece’s debt would not have been forgiven—because even
the judges filing separate opinions who would have reached this question did not necessarily
agree with Greece’s argument. Judge Hudson stated that it was unnecessary to determine
whether Greece had the capacity to pay the amount of the award from the previous arbitral
decision because Belgium had clarified in its pleadings that it was not seeking a lump sum
payment of that amount. Id. at 167. Moreover, Judge Hudson also thought that Greece had not
proven its inability to pay the amounts awarded. Id. Judge Eysinga did not state whether he
believed such a case had been made, but rather stated that such a determination was within the
tribunal’s jurisdiction, despite the parties’ statements to the contrary. Judge Eysinga did note,
however, that such a determination could be made only after receiving an expert report. Id. at
182.
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maintaining their economic equilibrium. As discussed in the next
section, the United States in particular has seen the need for BIT
clauses that aim to achieve this balance. Despite recognizing the need
for such provisions, however, the United States has failed to
implement a coherent approach to exceptions clauses in its BITs.
II. EXCEPTIONS CLAUSES IN US TREATY PRACTICE
In light of the narrow scope of the necessity plea in customary
international law, and indeed, the lingering doubts about the status
and existence of any such plea, States seeking to preserve an exit
from investment-treaty commitments have long done so with explicit
provisions to that effect in their investment treaties.
The United States has been a part of this trend, including
exceptions causes even in its earliest BITs and continuing this
practice today. In recent years, and particularly after the Argentina
decisions, exceptions clauses in BITs have received greater attention
from negotiators, including those in the United States. Thus, the
United States—like other States—has expanded its use of exceptions
clauses in recent treaties by including fact-specific exceptions as well
as a catch-all exception.
As described below, the 2012 US Model BIT includes three
separate exceptions clauses, one for matters of essential security,
another for environmental measures, and a third for financial
services.52 While US BITs have long included some form of the
essential security exception, the environmental and financial services
exceptions clauses are relatively new. In the following sections, these
two new clauses are discussed first, followed by an extended
discussion of the longstanding essential security exception.
A. Financial Services Exceptions
The lengthiest exceptions provision in the 2012 US Model BIT
is the “Financial Services” provision, which actually includes two
separate exceptions.53 The exceptions in the “Financial Services”
provision are exceedingly well-drafted and, as noted below, go a long
way toward balancing investor protection and the host State’s
freedom to respond to financial emergencies.
52. 2012 US Model BIT, supra note 7, at arts. 12, 18, 20.
53. Id. at art. 20.
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1. Description
The first financial services exception permits the host State to
take prudential actions related to financial services, particularly
actions to ensure the integrity and stability of the State’s financial
system. As that exception states:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this Treaty, a Party shall
not be prevented from adopting or maintaining measures relating
to financial services for prudential reasons, including for the
protection of investors, depositors, policy holders, or persons to
whom a fiduciary duty is owed by a financial services supplier,
or to ensure the integrity and stability of the financial system.
Where such measures do not conform with the provisions of this
Treaty, they shall not be used as a means of avoiding the Party’s
commitments or obligations under this Treaty.54

“Prudential reasons” under this provision “include[] the
maintenance of the safety, soundness, integrity, or financial
responsibility of individual financial institutions, as well as the
maintenance of the safety and financial and operational integrity of
payment and clearing systems.”55 The term “financial services” and
this exception generally tracks similar usage in international trade
law, and in US Free Trade Agreements, thus providing clarity to key
terms and guidance on the proper interpretation of this provision.56
In the same article, the 2012 US Model BIT includes a related
exception that preserves the host State’s freedom of action in
monetary and related policies: “Nothing in this Treaty applies to nondiscriminatory measures of general application taken by any public
entity in pursuit of monetary and related credit policies or exchange
rate policies.”57 This monetary policy exception also “derives from”

54. Id. at art. 20.
55. Id. at n.18.
56. Id. at art. 20(7). The term “financial services” has the same definition as under
paragraph 5(a) of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (“GATS”) Annex on Financial
Services. The so-called “prudential exception” was taken verbatim from article 2(a) of the
GATS Annex on Financial Services and recent US Free Trade Agreements (“FTAs”), the first
of which was NAFTA. Caplan & Sharpe, supra note 5, at 817 n.255.
57. 2012 US Model BIT, supra note 7, at art. 20(2)(a).
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international trade law,58 thus providing a context to the likely
application of this provision, despite its newness.59
The “Financial Services” provision of the 2012 US Model BIT
further provides procedural mechanisms that help ensure that arbitral
tribunals responsibly and thoroughly consider pleas under this clause.
The BIT provision sets out special procedures for choosing arbitrators
with expertise in finance if a respondent indicates an intention to
plead the “Financial Services” exceptions in response to a claim
against it.60 As the article states, “[i]n the appointment of all
arbitrators not yet appointed to the tribunal, each disputing party shall
take appropriate steps to ensure that the tribunal has expertise or
experience in financial services law or practice.” This requirement of
expertise applies also to the presiding arbitrator, and if the plea is
raised after the presiding arbitrator has been appointed “such
arbitrator shall be replaced at the request of either disputing party and
the tribunal shall be reconstituted” to take into consideration the need
for expertise to address the plea.61 Ensuring that the arbitrators have
expertise in financial matters goes a long way towards balancing
investment protection with preserving a State’s freedom to act in
response to an emergency.62 Arbitrators with such a background will
be better able to weigh the availability and relative effectiveness of
States’ emergency measures, determine whether a claim of financial
emergency has been manufactured, and are generally more likely to
reach reasonable decisions on the proper responses to a financial
emergency.

58. Caplan & Sharpe, supra note 5, at 818. The analogous trade-law provision is Article
I(3)(b) of the GATS, which excepts “services supplied in the exercise of governmental
authority” from the scope of the GATS.
59. The provision in the 2012 US Model BIT may be more limited than the analogous
trade-law provision, however, because the BIT provision is limited to governmental measures
in pursuit of monetary or exchange rate policies. Moreover, the provision specifically “do[es]
not include measures that expressly nullify or amend contractual provisions that specify the
currency of demonization or the rate of exchange of currencies” and the exception does not
affect investment agreement obligations regarding transfers or performance requirements.
2012 US Model BIT, supra note 7, at art. 20(2)(a) n.19. Despite these limitations, the tradelaw analogy provides guidance for the interpretation of such an article.
60. Id. In particular, the article seeks to ensure that the tribunal has sufficient expertise to
address the plea effectively.
61. 2012 US Model BIT, supra note 7, at art. 20(3)(c)(ii).
62. A further improvement to the provision might be to require that arbitrators have
expertise in assessment of investment risk, which would likely provide additional protection to
investors’ interests.
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The US Model BIT provision also permits States to take the
decision out of the hands of arbitrators if the financial emergency
provisions have been invoked. A State invoking the “Financial
Services” provision must also request a joint determination by the
financial authorities of both States party to the treaty as to the
applicability of the that provision in the particular case.63 If the
relevant authorities jointly decide that the “Financial Services”
provision has been properly invoked, this determination “shall be
binding on the tribunal.”64 This request procedure and its binding
character allows States a valuable and powerful tool in the arbitration,
even before the case begins in earnest. In particular, this request
procedure essentially allows States themselves to decide the scope of
the plea—albeit jointly—without resort to an arbitral panel, even a
panel of financially savvy arbitrators.
Finally, the article also includes a provision, new in the 2012
Model BIT, which permits the Tribunal to decide, at the respondent’s
request, the applicability of one of these exceptions “prior to deciding
the merits of the claim.”65 Provisions substantially similar to these
appear in the US-Rwanda BIT.66
2. Analysis
The “Financial Services” provision in the 2012 US Model BIT is
exceedingly detailed and well-drafted for balancing States’ interests
and investment protection in three particular respects. First, by
requiring arbitrators to have expertise in financial matters, the
financial services provision makes it more likely that a decision on
the existence of a financial emergency will be well-considered and

63. Moreover, under the 2012 US Model BIT, it appears that the United States wanted to
prevent tribunals from relying on non-agreement by the competent authorities in this provision
as an indication that a challenged financial measure violated the treaty—a provision added
after the 2004 US Model BIT states that “[t]he tribunal shall draw no inference regarding the
application [of either financial services exception] from the fact that the competent financial
authorities have not made [such a joint] determination.” Id. at art. 20(3)(c)(iii).
64. Id. at art. 20(3)(b).
65. Id. at art. 20(3)(e). Based on this change, and the change noted at note 63, it appears
that the 2012 US Model BIT provides slightly more freedom of action to host States than the
2004 US Model BIT.
66. Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of the Republic of Rwanda Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal
Protection of Investment art. 20, US-Rwanda, Feb. 19, 2008, T.I.A.S. 12101 [hereinafter USRwanda BIT].
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logical, rather than simply relying on a comparative perspective of
other financial crises.
Second, by permitting States to agree on whether the “Financial
Services” provision has been properly invoked and by making such an
agreement binding on an arbitral tribunal, this provision empowers
States party to the BIT to essentially negate the decision of an
investor to bring a claim. For the investor’s home State, this provision
resembles an anti-espousal provision by allowing the investor’s home
State to overrule the individual investor’s choice to bring an arbitral
claim against a treaty partner. In the traditional espousal context, by
contrast, the State chooses whether to bring the claim of its citizen
before an international tribunal.
Finally, by allowing arbitral tribunals to consider the “Financial
Services” provision as a preliminary matter, and particularly by
requiring such a preliminary decision if the respondent State requests,
this provision goes a long way to discourage frivolous claims by
investors and offers significant protection to respondent States in the
form of potentially saved legal costs. Thus, the “Financial Services”
provision in the 2012 US Model BIT reflects detailed consideration
and address States’ concerns in the context of invoking a necessity
plea to avoid obligations in an investment treaty, while still offering
credible and real protection to investment. Such detailed
consideration is less evident, however, in the other two exceptions in
the 2012 US Model BIT.
B. Environmental Exception
The second exceptions clause in the 2012 US Model BIT is
part of a provision called “Investment and Environment,” which
appears intended to provide particular leeway for States to enact laws
that protect the environment. As discussed in Section 2 below,
however, the “Investment and Environment” provision leaves much
to be desired in terms of clarity and balance.
1. Description
The “Investment and Environment” provision in the 2012 US
Model BIT states generally that “it is inappropriate to encourage
investment by weakening or reducing the protections afforded in
domestic environmental laws” and guarantees regulatory freedom
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with respect to environmental matters.67 US officials have written—in
an unofficial capacity—that this provision generally “reflect[s] the
policy goal of avoiding a ‘race to the bottom,’ where foreign
investment is pursued at the expense of the environment.”68
The “Investment and Environment” provision also contains
language that could be construed as an exception to investment
protections for environmental measures. This language provides,
“[n]othing in this Treaty shall be construed to prevent a Party from
adopting, maintaining, or enforcing any measure otherwise consistent
with this Treaty that it considers appropriate to ensure that investment
activity in its territory is undertaken in a manner sensitive to
environmental concerns.”69
This language has been characterized as part of the “definitions
and interpretive statements that define the scope of the Parties’
obligations” with respect to investment and environment.70
A similar provision was included the 2004 US Model BIT, but
the provision in the 2012 US Model BIT strengthened the protections
of the 2004 provision.71 Thereafter, this “Investment and
Environment” provision—including its apparent exceptions clause—
appeared in the most recent US BIT with Rwanda, which was signed
in 2008 and entered into force in 2012.72 The provision has not yet
been interpreted by arbitral tribunals.
2. Analysis
Ensuring that investment treaties are consistent with
environmental standards is an admirable goal. Indeed, both developed
67. 2012 US Model BIT, supra note 7, at art. 12(2).
68. Caplan & Sharpe, supra note 5, at 805.
69. 2012 US Model BIT, supra note 7, at art. 12. Article 12 also provides an opportunity
for a party to request consultations regarding matters arising under the Article, a provision that
is generally used in concert with other transparency and public participation provisions in the
US Model BIT, such as Articles 10 and 11.
70. Caplan & Sharpe, supra note 5, at 806.
71. Id. The 2012 US Model BIT added a general provision that “[t]he parties recognize
that their respective environmental laws and policies, and multilateral environmental
agreements to which they are both party, play an important role in protecting the
environment.” 2012 US Model BIT, supra note 7, at art. 12(1). The 2012 Model BIT also
states that “each party shall ensure that it does not waive or otherwise derogate from” these
provisions, id. at art. 12(2) (emphasis added), whereas the 2004 US Model BIT only required
that the treaty parties would “strive to ensure” this goal, 2004 US Model BIT art. 12(1),
available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/117601.pdf.
72. US-Rwanda BIT, supra note 66, at art. 12.
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and developing States—despite frequent disagreements on other
aspects of investment law—appear to agree on the importance of such
provisions in investment treaties.73 The ambiguities in the
“Investment and Environment” provision of the 2012 US Model BIT,
however, render that particular provision unsatisfactory in achieving
this goal.
First, the provision does not provide guidance on what
consequences might follow from a State’s decision to undertake a
measure that falls within the scope of this provision. Is that measure
“justified” so that no wrong is committed, or has the State still
committed a wrong, but this wrong is merely excused by this section?
A third possibility also exists—should a measure’s relationship to
environmental protection be considered in the calculation of damages
resulting from that measure, and accordingly reduce the damages
awarded? The 2012 US Model BIT provides no answers to these
questions, thus leaving them to the discretion of a potential future
arbitral tribunal.
Second, what latitude does the United States—or its treaty
partners—have in determining what environmental measures “it
considers” appropriate? As discussed below, the self-judging nature
of exceptions to obligations under international law raised much
concern during the drafting of the ILC Draft Articles. Despite this
concern over self-judging language, it is unclear what latitude the
inclusion of such language might provide in addition to the latitude
provided by the existence of the exception. The inclusion of this
language therefore appears likely to cause concern with US treaty
partners and potential treaty partners, and—even if ultimately
included in the treaty—will not greatly benefit the United States.
Third, what is the difference between an “appropriate” measure,
a “necessary” measure, and—as in the ILC Draft Articles’ necessity
provision—a measure that is the “only way” to achieve a certain
73. And indeed, both developed and developing countries have raised concerns that
investment treaties have led to decreases in their environmental protection standards. See
Stuart G. Gross, Note, Inordinate Chill: BITs, Non-NAFTA MITs, and Host-State Regulatory
Freedom—An Indonesia Case Study, 24 MICH. J. INT’L L. 893 (2003); Katie Zaunbrecher,
Note, Pac Rim Cayman v. Republic of El Salvador: Confronting Free Trade’s Chilling Effect
on Environmental Progress in Latin America, 33 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 489, 501–02 (2011)
(describing one multi-national’s arbitral case against El Salvador and suggesting that
“[i]nternational tribunals cannot force a government to repeal [environmental and public safety
regulations] but the potential for massive arbitral awards often produces a chilling effect on
responsible policy-making”).
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goal? The use of the loosely-defined word “appropriate,” when
combined with self-judging nature of the “it considers” language,
would appear to grant a State such wide latitude that any measure
even vaguely related to the environment could enjoy protection under
this provision. Such a result is hardly desirable in a treaty that, at its
core, seeks to protect investment.
Finally, how could the treaty be “construed to prevent” a party
from adopting a measure that is “otherwise consistent with this
treaty”? If a measure is consistent with the treaty, it cannot be
construed otherwise, can it? The first phrase, which states that the
treaty shall not be construed to prevent certain laws, indicates that the
clause was intended to exempt certain domestic environmental laws
from application of the treaty norms—that is, if a measure intended to
protect the environment would otherwise violate the guarantee of
“fair and equitable” treatment, this provision will preserve that
provision. The inclusion of the second phrase, “otherwise consistent
with this treaty,” however, indicates that such an environmental
measure would not be protected under this provision—if the measure
violates the fair and equitable treatment standard, it is not otherwise
consistent with the treaty, and therefore cannot enjoy protection under
this clause. This contradiction in phrases appears to defeat the entire
clause.
As the foregoing demonstrates, the ambiguous terms of the
“Investment and Environment” provision of the 2012 US Model BIT
leave much to the discretion of tribunals. Given such broad discretion,
as the Argentina cases demonstrate, arbitral tribunals may reach
undesirable, conflicting, or illogical decisions on these matters,
increasing uncertainty for both investors and States and potentially
leading to disastrous awards. Unfortunately, similar flaws appear in
the “Essential Security” provision, also potentially leading to an
unpredictable decision by an arbitral tribunal and a large award
against a State party.
C. Essential Security Exception
The oldest and most general of the exceptions clauses in the
2012 US Model BIT is the “Essential Security” provision. This
provision contains broader language than the other two exceptions
and therefore, particularly after the recent addition of the fact-specific
“Investment and Environment” and “Financial Services” clauses, may
be construed to serve as a catch-all exception clause. The “Essential
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Security” provision of US BITs has evolved significantly in recent
years. Among other developments, discussed more fully below, the
provision is now explicitly self-judging in both the treaty and the US
letter of transmittal, and the term “essential security” is left largely
undefined.
1. Description
The essential security clause in the 2012 US Model BIT, like
the “Investment and Environment” provision, contains explicitly selfjudging language. Also like the “Investment and Environment”
provision the “Essential Security” provision does not provide clear
definitions of relevant terms, such as what might be deemed an
essential security interest, and what consequences might follow from
measures that fall within this provision. The “Essential Security”
provision of the 2012 U.S. Model BIT provides, “[n]othing in this this
Treaty shall be construed: . . . to preclude a Party from applying
measures that it considers necessary for the fulfillment of its
obligations with respect to the maintenance or restoration of
international peace or security, or the protection of its own essential
security interests.”74
Although this version of the essential security clause was
included in the US Model BIT for the first time in 2004, it was
actually developed earlier as part of a previous unpublished update to
the 1994 US Model BIT.75 Accordingly this version of the essential
security clause is included in several recent investment agreements,
namely the US BITs with Bahrain,76 Mozambique,77 Uruguay,78 and
74. 2012 US Model BIT, supra note 7, at art. 18.
75. Kenneth Vandevelde writes that this self-judging language in the treaty provision
was part of a 1998 revision to the 1994 model treaty—apparently part of a general 1998
revision that was not treated publicly as resulting in a new model. Kenneth J. Vandevelde, A
Comparison of the 2004 and 1994 US Model BITs: Rebalancing Investor and Host State
Interests, in YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND POLICY 283 (Karl P.
Sauvant, ed., 2009).
76. Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of the State of Bahrain Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection
of Investment, US-Bahr., Sept. 29, 1999, T.I.A.S. 13065.
77. Treaty Between The United States of America and The Republic of Mozambique
Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, US-Mozam., Dec. 1,
1998, T.I.A.S. 13006.
78. Presidential Letter of Transmittal for the Uruguay Bilateral Investment Treaty art.
XVIII (Nov. 4, 2005) available at http://www.sice.oas.org/Investment/BITSbyCountry/BITs/
URU_US_e.asp
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Rwanda.79 Similar clauses appear in US treaties outside the BIT
context, such as the US-Panama Free Trade Agreement.80
This “Essential Security” provision has also warranted particular
attention in the letters of transmittal that the Executive Branch
provides to Congress when requesting the ratification of a BIT. For
the US-Bahrain BIT, for example, the letter of transmittal confirms
the self-judging nature of the clause, and seeks to add substance to the
terms “international peace and security” and “essential security
interest.” As that letter provides:
[The “Essential Security” provision] reserves the right of a Party
to take measures that it considers necessary for the fulfillment of
its international obligations with respect to maintenance or
restoration of international peace or security, as well as those
measures it regards as necessary for the protection of its own
essential security interests. International obligations with respect
to maintenance or restoration of peace or security would include,
for example, obligations arising out of Chapter VII of the United
Nations Charter. Measures permitted by the provision on the
protection of a Party’s essential security interests would include
security-related actions taken in time of war or national
emergency. Actions not arising from a state of war or national
emergency must have a clear and direct relationship to the
essential security interests of the Party involved. This Treaty
makes explicit the implicit understanding that measures to protect
a Party's essential security interests are self-judging in nature,
although each Party would expect the provisions to be applied by
the other in good faith.81

This language in the letter of transmittal gives a broad and
somewhat circular definition to the term “essential security
interests”—the letter defines that term to include not only actions
taken in war or national emergency but also other security-related
79. U.S-Rwanda BIT, supra note 66.
80. US-Panama FTA art 21.2 provides that
Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed:
To preclude a Party from applying measures that it considers necessary for the fulfillment
of its obligations with respect to the maintenance or restoration of international peace or
security, or the protection of its own essential security interests.
A footnote to this provision states that: “[f]or greater certainty, if a Party invokes Article
21.2 in an arbitral proceeding initiated under Chapter Ten (Investment) or Chapter Twenty
(Dispute Settlement), the tribunal or panel hearing the matter shall find that the exception
applies.” US-Panama Free Trade Agreement, US-Pan, Jun. 28, 2007.
81. Presidential Letter of Transmittal for the Bahrain Bilateral Investment Treaty,
available at http:// www.state.gov/documents/organization/43479.pdf.
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actions that have “a clear and direct relationship to the security
interests of the party involved. Under this definition, then, an essential
security interest is an interest that relates to security. Such a broad and
circular interpretation of the clause, combined with the self-judging
nature of the clause—although apparently subject to a good faith
test—could be seen to create an exceedingly broad exception to
investment treaty protections.
This provision was not always so broad, however, and the
language of this essential security clause has evolved significantly
since early US investment treaties. The self-judging language “it
considers” was absent in the early versions of this clause, and the
provision applied to measures aimed at both “the maintenance of
public order and public morals” as well as “essential security
interests.” These early BIT provisions are based on the 1984 US
Model BIT, which provided, “This Treaty shall not preclude the
application by either Party of measures necessary in its jurisdiction
for the maintenance of public order, the fulfillment of its obligations
with respect to the maintenance or restoration of international peace
or security, or the protection of its own essential security interests.”82
Clauses of this type—without the self-judging language and with
the reference to “public order”—are included in the US BITs with
Grenada,83 Bangladesh,84 Sri Lanka,85 Kyrgyzstan,86 Turkey,87
Panama,88 Czech Republic,89 Tunisia,90 and Argentina.91
82. US Model Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of
Investment art. X, Feb. 24, 1984, reprinted in 4 INT'L TAX & BUS. LAW. 136, 142 (1986).
83. Presidential Letter of Transmittal for the Grenada Bilateral Investment Treaty art. X,
May 2, 1986, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/43562.pdf.
84. Presidential Letter of Transmittal for the Bangladesh Bilateral Investment Treaty art.
X, Mar. 12, 1986, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/43480.pdf.
85. Presidential Letter of Transmittal for the Sri Lanka Bilateral Investment Treaty art.
X, Nov. 20, 1991, available at http://www.state.gov/e/eb/ifd/43361.htm.
86. Presidential Letter of Transmittal for the Kyrgyzstan Bilateral Investment Treaty art.
X, Jan. 19, 1993, available at http://tcc.export.gov/Trade_Agreements/All_Trade_Agreements/
exp_005704.asp.
87. Presidential Letter of Transmittal for the Turkey Bilateral Investment Treaty art. X,
Dec. 3, 1985, available at http://www.sice.oas.org/Investment/BITSbyCountry/BITs/
US_Turkey_e.asp.
88. Presidential Letter of Transmittal for the Panama Bilateral Investment Treaty art. X,
Oct. 27, 1982, available at http://www.state.gov/e/eb/ifd/43310.htm.
89. Presidential Letter of Transmittal for the Czech Republic Bilateral Investment Treaty
art. X, Oct. 22, 1991, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/43557.pdf.
90. Presidential Letter of Transmittal for the Tunisia Bilateral Investment Treaty art. X,
May 15, 1990, available at http://www.state.gov/e/eb/ifd/43364.htm.
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Other treaties of that time use this language, with the addition of
a reference to “public morals” or “morality.” For example, the USCongo BIT, which was signed in 1983 and entered into force in 1989,
contains the following provision:
This Treaty shall not preclude the application by either Party of
measures necessary in its territory for the maintenance of public
order and morality, the fulfillment of its obligations with respect
to the maintenance and restoration of international peace and
security, or the protection of its own essential security interests.92

A clause with substantially the same language, and substantially
the same explanation in the Letter of Submittal, appears in the US
BITs with Senegal,93 Cameroon,94 Morocco,95 and—with an
additional clause—Egypt.96
The letters of transmittal for these early treaties provide little
guidance on what might constitute “public order” or “public order and
morality,” but rather simply state that “this clause declares that the
treaty shall not preclude measures necessary for public order or
essential security interests.”97 In later treaties, the language of the
“Essential Security” provision remained the same, but the letter of
transmittal provided more detail. The letter of transmittal for the USKazakhstan BIT, for example, which was signed in 1992 and entered
91. Presidential Letter of Transmittal for the Argentina Bilateral Investment Treaty art.
X, Nov. 14, 1991, available at http://tcc.export.gov/trade_agreements/all_trade_agreements/
exp_000897.asp.
92. Presidential Letter of Transmittal for the Congo Bilateral Investment Treaty art. X,
Aug. 3, 1984, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/43544.pdf.
93. Presidential Letter of Transmittal for the Senegal Bilateral Investment Treaty art. X,
Dec. 6, 1983, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/43585.pdf.
94. Presidential Letter of Transmittal for the Cameroon Bilateral Investment Treaty art.
X, Feb. 26, 1986, available at http://www.state.gov/e/eb/ifd/43244.htm.
95. Presidential Letter of Transmittal for the Morocco Bilateral Investment Treaty art. X,
July 22, 1985, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/43580.pdf.
96. Presidential Letter of Transmittal for the Egypt Bilateral Investment Treaty art. X,
Mar. 11, 1986, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/43559.pdf. Article X
provides in relevant part:
This Treaty shall not preclude the application by either Party or any subdivision thereof
of any and all measures necessary for the maintenance of public order and morals, the
fulfillment of its existing international obligations, the protection of its own security interests,
or such measures deemed appropriate by the Parties to fulfill future international obligations.
This last clause , which permits “measures deemed appropriate by the Parties” to fulfill
future international obligations” appears unique in US BITs, and the meaning of this provision
is not revealed in the letter of transmittal or other documents.
97. Presidential Letter of Transmittal for the Congo Bilateral Investment Treaty art. X,
Aug. 3, 1984, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/43544.pdf.
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into force in 1994, gives meaning to the terms public order,
obligations with respect to peace and security, and essential security:
The maintenance of public order would include measures taken
pursuant to a Party's police powers to ensure public health and
safety. International obligations with respect to peace and
security would include, for example, obligations arising out of
Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. Measures permitted
by the provision on the protection of a Party's essential security
interests would include security-related actions taken in time of
war or national emergency; actions not arising from a state of
war or national emergency must have a clear and direct
relationship to the essential security interest of the Party
involved.98

Indeed, the language included in this early letter of transmittal is
still included in the letters of transmittal for the most recent current
BITs.
Further, although the treaty provision itself is the same as in the
1984 Model BIT, except for the self-judging language, the letter of
transmittal states that clause is self-judging: measures it regards as
necessary for the maintenance of public order, the fulfillment of its
international obligations with respect to international peace and
security, or measures which it regards as necessary for the protection
of its own essential security interests.99
Thus, it appears that the United States came to view this
language as self-judging, or at least wished that the language would
be so viewed by others, sometime after 1994. The same combination
of treaty language and letter-of-transmittal language appears in US
BITs that entered into force in 1994 or thereafter100—specifically, in

98. Presidential Letter of Transmittal for the Kazakhstan Bilateral Investment Treaty art.
X, May 19, 1992, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/43566.pdf. The
treaty provision in question provides, “This Treaty shall not preclude the application by either
Party of measures necessary for the maintenance of public order, the fulfillment of its
obligations with respect to the maintenance or restoration of international peace or security, or
the protection of its own essential security interests.”
99. Id.
100. The transition was not completely smooth because the US BITs with Romania and
Poland, both of which entered into force in 1994, retain the previous (non-self-judging) letter
of transmittal.
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the US BITs with Moldova,101 Armenia,102 Latvia,103 Ukraine,104
Jamaica,105 Ecuador,106 Estonia,107 and Mongolia.108
Later, letters of transmittal acquired the additional sentence that
we see in the US-Bahrain treaty quoted above—with a double
reference to self-judgment, but the assurance that “each Party would
expect the provisions to be applied by the other in good faith.” A
similar combination of the language in the letter of transmittal and the
treaty appears in the US BITs with Trinidad & Tobago,109 Georgia,110
Albania,111 Azerbaijan,112 Bolivia,113 Honduras,114 Jordan,115 and
Lithuania.116 Even in these mid 1990s treaties, however, with this
double reference to self-judgment in the letter of transmittal, the
treaty provision itself still contained no reference to self-judgment.
The only significant change from the 1984 Model BIT provision
101. Presidential Letter of Transmittal for the Moldova Bilateral Investment Treaty art.
IX,
Sept.
7,
1993,
available
at
http://tcc.export.gov/Trade_Agreements/
All_Trade_Agreements/exp_005862.asp.
102. Presidential Letter of Transmittal for the Armenia Bilateral Investment Treaty art.
X, Sept. 23, 1992, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/43477.pdf.
103. Presidential Letter of Transmittal for the Latvia Bilateral Investment Treaty art. IX,
Jan. 13, 1995, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/43568.pdf.
104. Presidential Letter of Transmittal for the Ukraine Bilateral Investment Treaty art.
IX,
Mar.
4,
1994,
available
at
http://tcc.export.gov/Trade_Agreements/
All_Trade_Agreements/exp_005484.asp.
105. Presidential Letter of Transmittal for the Jamaica Bilateral Investment Treaty art. X,
Feb. 4, 1994, available at http://www.state.gov/e/eb/ifd/43289.htm.
106. Presidential Letter of Transmittal for the Ecuador Bilateral Investment Treaty art.
IX, Aug. 27, 1993, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/43558.pdf.
107. Presidential Letter of Transmittal for the Estonia Bilateral Investment Treaty art.
IX, Apr. 19, 1994, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/43560.pdf.
108. Presidential Letter of Transmittal for the Mongolia Bilateral Investment Treaty art.
X, Oct. 6, 1994, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/43579.pdf.
109. Presidential Letter of Transmittal for the Trinidad & Tobago Bilateral Investment
Treaty art. XIV, Sept. 26, 1994, available at http://www.state.gov/e/eb/ifd/43363.htm.
110. Presidential Letter of Transmittal for the Georgia Bilateral Investment Treaty art.
XIV, Mar. 7, 1994, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/43561.pdf.
111. Presidential Letter of Transmittal for the Albania Bilateral Investment Treaty art.
XIV, Jan. 11, 1995, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/43474.pdf.
112. Presidential Letter of Transmittal for the Azerbaijan Bilateral Investment Treaty art.
XIV, Aug. 1, 1997, available at http://www.state.gov/e/eb/ifd/43235.htm.
113. Presidential Letter of Transmittal for the Bolivia Bilateral Investment Treaty art.
XIV, Apr. 17, 1998, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/43541.pdf.
This BIT is now terminated.
114. Presidential Letter of Transmittal for the Honduras Bilateral Investment Treaty art.
XIV, July 1, 1995, available at http://www.state.gov/e/eb/ifd/43264.htm.
115. Presidential Letter of Transmittal for the Jordan Bilateral Investment Treaty art.
XIV, July 2, 1997, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/43565.pdf.
116. S. TREATY DOC. No. 106–42 art. IX (1998), available at 1998 WL 1788085.
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quoted above was the omission of the reference to “public order.”
Only in very recent BITs was the language of the treaty itself
changed.
The purposes of adding this self-judging language to the
“Essential Security” provision included preserving greater regulatory
discretion of the host State with respect to investment and
circumscribing the discretion of arbitral tribunals, should a State’s
regulation be challenged.117 According to one former US government
official, the self-judging language in the treaty means that “a [S]tate
has sole discretion to determine whether a measure it has adopted
falls within the exception.”118 Current US officials take the same
position regarding the same language the 2012 Model BIT, stating
“[t]he phrase ‘it considers’ clarifies the intent of the Parties: the
determination of what is necessary for the fulfillment of its
obligations with respect to the maintenance and restoration of
international peace and security and the protection of its essential
security interests is within the discretion of that party.”119
2. Analysis
The current version of the “Essential Security” provision in US
BITs has three major problems. First, like the “Investment and
Environment” provision, the “Essential Security” provision leaves
key terms undefined. The treaty does not reveal what might constitute
an “essential security” interest, and even the letter of transmittal
defines this term in a circular fashion. If this provision is invoked,
arbitral tribunals will be left to use their discretion to determine what
might constitute an essential security interest.
In addition, and also like the “Investment and Environment”
provision, the inclusion of the self-judging “it considers” language
likely does nothing to preserve freedom of action for the respondent
State. As discussed below, however, such language has caused
concern in the international community and is not likely to prove
popular with investors. Thus, attempts to invoke this clause and its

117. Vandevelde, supra note 75, at 283. Vandevelde is careful to note, however, than the
2004 model is not weaker than the 1994 model in its protection of investment—instead the
2004 treaty involves “both the enhancement of host country regulatory discretion and an
expansion of host country obligations.” Id.
118. Id. at n.49.
119. Caplan & Sharpe, supra note 5, at 813.
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self-judging nature may be criticized, and arbitral tribunals may
simply read that language narrowly in light of this larger concern.
Finally, the essential security clause, like the “Investment and
Environment” provision, does not identify what consequences flow
from conduct that falls within the “Essential Security” provision. Is
such conduct excused, or justified, or does the presence of an
essential security interest mean that the conduct reduces damages?
Stability and predictability is of fundamental importance to both
States and investors—indeed ensuring stability of legal rules has
always been a principle reason behind the conclusion of BITs—but
this purpose is undermined by such wildcard language as in this selfjudging exception clause.
D. Conclusions with Respect to Exceptions in US BITs
As discussed above, the exceptions clauses in the 2012 US
Model BIT, other than the financial security exceptions, are
unsatisfactory in the goal of providing a clear balance between
investment protection and host-State regulatory authority. A general
problem with the “Investment and Environment” and “Essential
Security” clauses is their self-judging language, which as discussed
below, is a clumsy way of attempting to retain freedom of action for
the host State and may not even succeed in achieving this goal. In
addition, US BIT negotiators should clarify the relationship of these
various exceptions clauses as between each other to clarify the scope
of the host State’s freedom of action with respect to each type of
exception.
1. Problems with Self-Judging Language
As noted above, it is unclear what consequences flow from the
self-judging nature of the “Investment and Environment” and
“Essential Security” provisions of the 2012 US Model BIT. Does the
phrase “it considers” have the same meaning with respect to measures
taken to “ensure that investment activity in its territory is undertaken
in a manner sensitive to environmental concerns” as well as measures
for the “protection of [the host State’s] own essential security
interests”? What is the significance of the absence of the phrase “it
considers” in the “Financial Services” provision, particularly in light
of that provision’s requirement of consultation between the finance
ministries of the relevant States if the exception is to be invoked in an
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arbitration? A logical position may be that the “it considers” language
has been omitted from the “Financial Services” provision because the
host State may obtain an official joint determination that the measures
in question fall within the exception. The absence of any explanation
for the inconsistent use of self-judging language, however, renders
even the “Financial Services” provision unclear.
A second problem with the self-judging language is that there is
no definitive interpretation of self-judging clauses in international
law, and therefore neither the United States nor its investors can be
sure how such a clause would be interpreted or applied in a given
investment dispute. Moreover, there does not seem to be a significant
difference between self-judging and non-self judging provisions in
international law.120 The International Court of Justice (“ICJ”)
considered similar self-judging language in an information-sharing
agreement in the Case Concerning Certain Questions of Mutual
Assistance in Criminal Matters (Djibouti v. France).121 The ICJ held
that, although a self-judging clause grants a State “very considerable
discretion[,] this exercise of discretion is still subject to the obligation
of good faith codified in Article 26 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties.”122 Thus, the ICJ concluded that it had authority
to examine whether the State had taken the action in question for
reasons permitted under the self-judging clause.123
120. Necessity provisions that are not explicitly self-judging have been interpreted
narrowly. As the International Court of Justice has stated, “whether a given measure is
‘necessary’ is ‘not purely a question for the subjective judgment of the party’ and may thus be
assessed by the Court.” Oil Platforms (Iran v. US), Judgment, 2003 I.C.J. 161, ¶ 43 (Nov. 6)
(quoting Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. US),
Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 141, ¶ 282 (June 27)).
121. In that case, the clause concerned the obligation to provide assistance in criminal
matters and provided that, as an exception to the general obligation to provide such assistance,
“the requested State may refuse a request for mutual assistance if it considers that execution of
the request is likely to prejudice [the] sovereignty, . . . security, . . . ordre public or other . . .
essential interests [of the State from which information is requested].” 2008 I.C.J. 179, ¶ 28
(June 4) (quoting the French court’s decision on the matter).
122. Djibouti, 2008 I.C.J. ¶ 145. Article 26 states that “[e]very treaty in force is binding
upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith.” Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties art. 26, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
123. Djibouti, 2008 I.C.J. ¶ 145. Good faith review, according to Judge Keith’s separate
opinion, may also require States “to exercise the power [in question] for the purposes for
which it was conferred and without regard to improper purposes or irrelevant factors.” See id.
at 279 ¶ 6 (declaration of Judge Keith); see also Stephan Schill & Robyn Briese, “If the State
Considers”: Self-Judging Clauses in International Dispute Settlement, 13 MAX PLANCK Y.B.
U.N. L. 61, 140 (2009) (“suggest[ing] that international Courts and Tribunals should adopt,
similar to the position taken by Judge Keith in his Declaration in Djibouti v. France, an
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State practice related to the security exception in the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade also indicates that self-judging
clauses are subject to good-faith review to ensure the clauses are
invoked for intended purposes only.124 And indeed, even the arbitral
panel that decided the LG&E v. Argentina dispute—which was
relatively sympathetic toward Argentina’s arguments based on the
essential security clause of the US-Argentina BIT—found no
discernable difference between a self-judging and a non-self-judging
clause. The tribunal concluded that the provision was not selfjudging, but stated that, “[w]ere the Tribunal to conclude that the
provision is self-judging, Argentina’s determination would be subject
to a good faith review anyway, which does not significantly differ
from the substantive analysis presented here.”125 Although there is
some room for debate on the matter, the general consensus seems to
be that self-judging clauses provide little, if any, additional freedom
of action to the State.126
approach that focuses on the characteristic element of self-judging clauses, namely the
discretion accorded to States to favor domestic over international interests, by drawing on the
grounds of judicial review for misuse of discretion under domestic administrative law
systems.”). US government officials—writing in their personal capacity—have acknowledged
this general interpretation of self-judging clauses, and specifically the ICJ’s Djibouti v. France
judgment in commentary on the 2012 US Model BIT. As these officials have stated, the Court
acknowledged that France had “‘very considerable discretion’” and that “the Court conducted
a very light review of the basis for France’s decision.” Caplan & Sharpe, supra note 5, at 755,
814 n.251 (quoting Djibouti, 2008 I.C.J. ¶ 145). The authors state that they are “not aware of
any investor-State arbitral tribunal that has directly analysed the operation of a self-judging
essential security provision.” Id.
124. See Alford, supra note 11, at 706–25. A General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(“GATT”) Panel has considered the matter in the context of US sanctions against Nicaragua
and issued a report that, although not binding, encourages states to weigh competing interests
when invoking a self-judging security clause, and noting that an entirely self-judging security
clause could be invoked “excessively of or for purposes other than those set out.” Report of the
Panel, United States-Trade Measures Affecting Nicaragua, ¶¶ 5.1–5.18, L/6053 (Oct. 13,
1986), available at http://www.worldtradelaw.net/reports/gattpanels/nicembargo.pdf.
125. LG&E Award, supra note 13, ¶¶ 212–14. In this good faith review, the Tribunal
concluded that the measures Argentina adopted were “a necessary and legitimate measure”
because “[u]nder the conditions the Government faced . . . time was of the essence in crafting a
response.” Id. ¶ 240.
126. One commentator has suggested that “[w]hile reviewability might seem to be the
favoured interpretation . . . it is nevertheless possible that States might design necessity clauses
that give complete deference to a State’s judgment that an emergency or necessity threatening
the life of the nation exist. In this case, the extent of institutional review might be limited
instead to the proportionality of measures taken during the situation of emergency or
necessity.” Desierto, supra note 44, at 142. Such a proposition is illogical, however, because
the existence of an essential security interest does not depend on the degree of action taken to
preserve that interest.
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Indeed, such a narrow reading of self-judging language in
investment treaties may be appropriate because a broad reading of
such clauses could defeat the entire investment regime. In fact, some
commentators have taken this exact position with respect to
investment treaties as a general matter:
A sweeping interpretation of necessity, as a self-judging doctrine
causing the wholesale inapplicability of investment treaties,
jeopardies the rules-based system and institutionalized dispute
resolution processes inherent in the architecture of international
investment obligations. Apart from creating the moral hazard of
contracting States opting out of international obligations at their
own instance (and disregarding the settled treaty modes of
denunciation, suspension, or termination), this interpretation
foments the threat of unbridled arbitrator discretion.127

The same view has been expressed by a former US government
official with respect to the 2012 US Model BIT in particular:
To my mind, the primary purpose of a BIT is to ensure that
foreign investment is treated in accordance with the rule of law.
For this reason, self-judging exceptions are especially troubling.
A provision that exempts treaty provisions from the judicial or
arbitral process is very difficult to reconcile with a treaty
intended to establish the rule of law.128

The potential for self-judgment also troubled members of the
ILC in the discussions of the necessity provision of the ILC Draft
Articles. As one committee member stated, “[t]here was always
competition between the interests of the two States concerned; it
might therefore be asked who was to decide which interest should
prevail. If such a subjective criterion was retained, a State might be
tempted to invoke the state of necessity abusively as a ground for
preclusion of wrongfulness.”129 In fact, the representative from the
former Czechoslovakia found that a self-judging necessity plea could
threaten the principle of sovereign equality.130 In an equally serious
127. Id. at 211.
128. Kenneth Vandevelde, Rebalancing through Exceptions, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L.
REV. 449, 458 (2013).
129. Draft articles on State responsibility. Texts adopted by the Drafting Committee:
articles 33 to 35 - reproduced in document A/CN.4/SR.1635, paras. 42, 53 and 62, [1980] 1
Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 271, ¶ 48, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.318.
130. Comments and observations of Governments on part one of the Draft Articles on
State responsibility for internationally wrongful acts, [1983] 2(1) Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 2,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/362. Czechoslovakia also objected to permitting a state to invoke a
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condemnation, the UK representative, in 1998, stated that a State’s
ability to determine what interest it deems essential would not only be
open to “very serious abuse across the whole range of international
relations” but could also “weaken the rule of law.”131
Indeed, there has long been suspicion of purportedly selfjudging obligations in international law. Judge Higgins wrote that
self-judging exceptions to acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction in
the ICJ are “of doubtful legal status, because it is the Court that must
determine its own jurisdiction.”132 Judge Lauterpacht took a stronger
view, arguing in his separate opinions to ICJ decisions that a selfjudging reservation excepting some disputes from consent to the ICJ’s
jurisdiction was invalid, and that the State in question had therefore
simply consented to ICJ jurisdiction without reservation because such
consent was essential and could not be severed from the treaty.133
necessity plea in circumstances other than the presence of an immediate threat to the existence
of the State as a sovereign and independent entity. Id.
131. Comments and observations received by Governments on State Responsibility,
[1998] 2(1) Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 134–35, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/488.
132. ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS & PROCESS 194 (1995).
133. As Judge Lauterpacht wrote in his separate opinion in Certain Norwegian Loans
(France v. Norway):
In accepting the jurisdiction of the Court Governments are free to limit its jurisdiction in
a drastic manner. As a result there may be little left in the Acceptance which is subject to the
jurisdiction of the Court. This the Governments, as trustees of the interests entrusted to them,
are fully entitled to do. Their right to append reservations which are not inconsistent with the
Statute is no longer in question. But the question whether that little that is left is or is not
subject to the jurisdiction of the Court must be determined by the Court itself. Any conditions
or reservations which purport to deprive the Court of that power are contrary to an express
provision of the Statute and to the very notion, embodied in Article 36 (6),of conferment of
obligatory jurisdiction upon the Court. As such they are invalid. It has been said that as
Governments are free to accept or not to accept the Optional Clause, they are free to accept the
very minimum of it. Obviously. But that very minimum must not be in violation of the Statute.
1957 I.C.J. 9, 46 (July 6); see also Roslyn Moloney, Incompatible Reservations to
Human Rights Treaties: Severability and the Problem of State Consent, 5 MELB. J. INT’L L.
155, 159, 163–64 (2004) (discussing Lauterpacht’s views and the three possible consequences
of an invalid reservation to a treaty). Thus, one could argue that, if an investment treaty has a
self-judging exceptions clause, then either the entire treaty is invalid, or the exceptions
provisions are simply severed, and the State must offer full investment protections even in
times of emergency, unless the requirements of necessity under customary international law
are met. Such an argument could be bolstered with the argument that such a clause defeats the
object and purpose of the treaty—protecting investment—because it permits a state to opt out
of those protections at its own will, and indeed the clause is detrimental to the rule of law. See
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 19, opened for signature May 23, 1969, 1115
U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan 27, 1980) (“A State may, when signing, ratifying,
accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty, formulate a reservation unless . . . the reservation
is incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty.”) Under this logic, a tribunal
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A counter-argument to the foregoing criticism of self-judging
clauses may be that self-judgment in the investment-treaty context is
appropriate because the competing interests in are inherently unequal.
Under a State-centric concept of international law, a State’s concerns
for its own essential security or even environmental concerns would
always outweigh the private interests of an individual investor. If this
is the reason that the United States has included such language in its
BITs, however, the United States should simply so explain in the
terms of the treaty. The lack of such explanation permits the
importation of general concerns in international law regarding selfjudging language, and these concerns arise out of areas as diverse as
consent to the ICJ’s compulsory jurisdiction to the obligation to assist
in criminal investigations. Clearly at least some of these concerns
may not be applicable in the investment context, and the United States
would be well-advised to clarify its use of that language.
Thus, the self-judging language in the “Investment and
Environment” and “Essential Security” provisions of the 2012 US
Model BIT, as currently drafted, likely gains the United States little or
nothing in terms of freedom of action. The provision costs the United
States a tremendous amount, however, in terms of credibility and
reputation in its relations with investors, potential treaty partners, and
the international community in general.
2. Failure to State Relationship Between Exceptions Provisions
A second fundamental problem with the exceptions provisions of
the 2012 US Model BIT is that the model treaty provides no guidance
on the relationship between these various exceptions provisions. Does
the United States intend to preserve greater freedom of action for host
States with respect to actions “necessary” to protect an essential
security interest, than actions “appropriate” to protect the
environment? Such a position would be rational, and as noted below,
would be consistent with the approaches taken by other States in their
model BITs and BITs in force. The US Model BIT provides no
guidance on this question, however, because the “Investment and
Environment,” “Financial Services,” and “Essential Security”
provisions are contained in three separate, self-contained articles of

conceivably could declare the entire treaty invalid on the basis of an invalid exceptions clause,
or perhaps simply could read that clause out of the treaty.
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the treaty, and the treaty lacks any umbrella provision to govern all
three.
Another unanswered question regarding the relationship between
these provisions is whether an environmental or financial measure
may fall within the “Essential Security” provision, despite the
inclusion of the subject-matter-specific “Investment and
Environment” and “Financial Services” provisions. That is, did the
“Essential Security” provision ever apply to financial emergencies
and environmental disasters, and did the United States intend to
narrow the definition of an essential security interest in its BITs by
including these subject-matter specific provisions? Such a position
would be a departure from existing practice by international law.
Even ILC representatives who were skeptical of other parts of the
necessity provision of the ILC draft articles agreed that an
environmental disaster could constitute an essential interest. As the
UK representative stated, essential interests were “interests so
essential that a breach of them threatens the economic or social
stability of the State, or serious personal injury or environmental
damage on a massive scale.”134
Indeed this was precisely the holding of the ICJ in the
Gab íkovo Nagymaros case, and has been alluded to in other cases.
There, the ICJ held that it had “no difficulty in acknowledging that
the concerns expressed by Hungary for its natural environment . . .
related to an ‘essential interest’ of that State” within the meaning of
the then-current version of the ILC Draft Articles.135 In Gab íkovo
Nagymaros, the ICJ also repeated a statement from its Advisory
Opinion in the Legality of the Threat of Nuclear Weapons, that “‘the
environment is not an abstraction but represents the living space,
the quality of life and the very health of human beings, including
generations unborn. The existence of the general obligation of
States to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction and control
respect the environment of other States or of areas beyond national
control is now part of the corpus of international law relating to the
134. Comments and observations received by Governments on State Responsibility,
[2001] 2(1) Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 56, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/515. In fact, the United Kingdom
took the position that necessity was “at the very edge of the rule of law” and that “it should not
be included in a set of draft articles that describe the routine framework of legal responsibility
between states.” Id.
135. The Gab ikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung./Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, 41, ¶ 53 (Sept.
25).
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environment.’”136 Indeed this concept was expanded into a duty to
protect the environment in the Pulp Mills case, where the ICJ
stated that “[a] [S]tate is . . . obliged to use all the means at its
disposal in order to avoid activities which take place in its territory
. . . causing significant damage to the environment of another
State. This court has established that this obligation is ‘now part of
the corpus of international law relating to the environment.’”137
Thus, protection of the environment may arguably be an essential
security interest, and the failure to define that the term in the 2012
US Model BIT leads to confusion, particularly in light of the
inclusion of the “Investment and Environment” provision.
An additional problem in the relationship between the articles is
presented by the differing verbs used therein. Under the “Investment
and Environment” provision, the United States is not precluded from
“adopting, maintaining, or enforcing” measures that fall within the
clause. Under the “Essential Security” clause, by contrast, the United
States is not precluded from “applying” a measure that falls within the
clause. One reading of this difference in language may be that a State
may “apply” existing measures to address matters of essential
security, but it may not “adopt” additional measures to protect
essential security interests, whereas it may adopt such measures to
protect the environment. Indeed, this reading would be a significant
limitation on the host State’s ability to protect its essential security
interests, and would mean that the State has more freedom in
responding to environmental concerns than essential security matters.
An alternative reading is that the term “applying” encompasses the
terms “adopting, maintaining, or enforcing” and includes an even
broader swath of State action that would not necessarily follow the
usual course of legislation. Such a reading is logical because the
United States must have intended to preserve greater ability to react to
a threatened “essential security” interest than in the area of
environmental legislation, particularly because the “essential interest”
category appears to include wars, insurrections, and similar actions.
Although this second reading of the clause appears more logical than
the first, the first reading remains plausible and thus could be adopted
by an arbitral tribunal. If the United States intends to preserve greater
136. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J.
241-42, ¶ 29 (July 8).
137. Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru.), Judgment, 2010 I.C.J. 14, 56, ¶ 101
(Apr. 20).

40

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 38:1

freedom of action in the “Essential Security” provision—as the
second reading would indicate—it should explicitly so state in the
treaty. As the treaty stands, the matter is left to the discretion of
arbitral tribunals.
There is an alternative to leaving such questions to arbitral
tribunals, however. As discussed in the following section, other States
have been creative in drafting their exceptions clauses, and have come
up with various ways to preserve their freedom of action including
reporting requirements and detailed provisions relating to the
consequences of invoking these clause for both liability of the host
State, and potential measures of damages. By incorporating some of
these methods, the United States could improve the functioning and
clarity of its BITs, while still protecting investments and preserving
freedom of action of the host State in emergency situations.
III. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF BIT EXCEPTIONS
As noted above, the United States is not the only State to
recognize the need to protect its “essential security” or similar
interests in its investment treaties. In fact, such an exceptions
provision was included in the very first investment treaty, between
Germany and Pakistan, concluded in 1959.138 In that BIT, Pakistan
reserved the right to deny investment protections for reasons of public
security by appending the following statement to its acceptance of the
treaty:
It is our understanding that, intending to facilitate and promote
investments by German nationals or companies in Pakistan, the
Government of Pakistan will, prior to the entry into force of an
establishment treaty the negotiation of which has been provided
for, grant necessary permits to German nationals who desire to
enter, stay and carryon activities in Pakistan in connection with
investments by German nationals or companies except in so far
as reasons of public security and order, public health or morality
may warrant otherwise.139

Like Pakistan’s statement in its BIT with Germany, early model
treaties and non-binding instruments also demonstrate that States

138. Treaty for the Promotion and Protection of Investments (with Protocol and
exchange of notes), Ger.-Pak., November 25, 1959, 24 U.N.T.S. 6575.
139. Id. at n.V (emphasis added).
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sought specific exceptions for cases of war, revolution, or similar
situations. These traditional clauses are discussed in Section A below.
As discussed in Section B, States have recently begun refining
this practice and including particularized exceptions clauses more
frequently in their investment treaties. A comparison of these recent
clauses to their predecessors reveals that States have begun to
consider the circumstances under which they might seek to invoke an
exception to investment-treaty protections, and States appear to seek
to reserve such an exception not only for situations of armed conflict
but also for a financial emergency or an environmental disaster, as the
United States has done. As noted in this Section, this development in
the exceptions clauses reflects States’ evolving thinking in how to
treat investment protections in times of emergency, and this
comparative process offers guidance for the United States in its BIT
negotiations with China and beyond.
A. Traditional Exceptions Clauses
Even the oldest BITs include clauses that permit exceptions to
certain investment protections in times of war, generally requiring
only treatment as favorable as domestic enterprises during such times.
One such clause has long been included in the German model BIT,
and still remains part of that treaty. The current iteration, which
differs only slightly from the original provision, states:
Investors of either Contracting State whose investments suffer
losses in the territory of the other Contracting State owing to war
or other armed conflict, revolution, a state of national emergency,
or revolt, shall be accorded treatment no less favourable by such
other Contracting State than that State accords to its own
investors as regards restitution, indemnification, compensation or
other valuable consideration.140

This provision, which essentially requires national treatment
during situations of armed conflict, is echoed in the treaties of several
other States.141 In fact, a similar provision appears in the 1959 Draft
Convention on Investments Abroad, more commonly known as the
Abs-Shawcross Convention, after its principle drafters Herman Abs,
140. Treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany and concerning the
Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments art. 4, § 3, 2008, Federal Ministry
for Economics and Technology.
141. E.g., Netherlands Model Treaty art. 7.
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of the Deutsche Bank, and Lord Shawcross, former UK Attorney
General.142 As the Abs-Shawcross provision states:
No Party may take measures derogating from the present
Convention unless it is involved in war, hostilities, or other
public emergency, which threatens its life; and such measures
shall be limited in extent and duration to those strictly required
by the exigencies of the situation. Nothing in this Article shall be
construed as superseding the generally accepted laws of war.143

Other non-binding instruments of this time also foreshadowed
future investment-treaty exceptions. Under the 1961 Harvard Draft
Convention on the International Responsibility of States for Injuries
to Aliens, for example, treatment of alien property that would be
otherwise wrongful could be justified based on “[t]he actual necessity
of maintaining public order, health, or morality in accordance with
laws enacted for that purpose” so long as those measures did not
unreasonably depart from domestic law or principles of justice.144
This provision—with its reference to public order and
morality—rather obviously foreshadows the original version of the
“Essential Security” provision in US BITs, and similar provisions in
other States’ BITs. The important difference between this Harvard
Draft Convention and the original US “Essential Security” clause,
however, is the Harvard Draft Convention’s requirement that the
measures do not unreasonably depart from domestic law or principles
of justice. The inclusion of this language indicates that investments
would still be protected to some degree even if measures were taken
to achieve public order, health, or morality, and thus offers a clear
balance between the interests of investors and those of States.
A guarantee of some protection was not included, however, in
the “derogations” provision of the 1967 Organization for Economic
Co-Operation and Development (“OECD”) Draft Convention on the
Protection of Foreign Property:
A party may take measures in derogation of this Convention only
if:
142. ANDREW NEWCOMB & LLUIS PARADELL, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INVESTMENT
TREATIES: STANDARDS OF TREATMENT 21–22 (2009).
143. Herman Abs & Lord Shawcross, The Proposed Convention to Protect Foreign
Investment: A Round Table Comment on the Draft Convention by its Authors, 9 J. PUB. L.
116–17 (1960) (text of art. V).
144. Louis B. Sohn & R.R. Baxter, Responsibility of States for Injuries to the Economic
Interests of Aliens, 55 AM. J. INT’L L. 545, 549 (1961).
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(i) involved in war, hostilities or other grave public
emergency of a nation-wide character due to force majeure
or provoked by unforeseen circumstances or threatening its
essential security interests; or
(ii) taken pursuant to decisions of the Security Council of
the United Nations or to recommendations of the Security
Council or General Assembly of the United Nations
relating to the maintenance or restoration of international
peace and security.
Any such measures shall be provisional in character and shall be
limited in extent and duration to those strictly required by the
exigencies of the situation.145

Elements of the “Essential Security” provision in the US 2012
Model BIT are also clear in this provision of the OECD Draft
Convention—in particular, the reference to UN Security Council
actions and the maintenance of international peace and security.
Although these instruments are forward-thinking in their use
of exceptions clauses, they do not set out a hierarchy of interests that
allows more or less derogation from the investment treaty protections,
depending on the gravity of the interest protected. Instead, these
provisions differ among each other as to what protection, if any,
might apply when an exceptions provision is invoked: Under the
German Model Treaty, foreign investors can expect national
treatment in a time of war; under the Harvard Draft Articles, they can
expect to be treated within the provisions of national law and
principles of justice; under the Abs-Shawcross and the OECD Draft
Conventions, however, investors can expect no such protection.
As discussed in the next section, these early BIT practices and
non-binding instruments have evolved into more complex and more
deft treaty provisions, as States have realized the particular situations
in which they might seek an exception to investment-treaty
protections, and exactly the extent of any such exception. These
newer treaties present a more sophisticated understanding of the
relative interests that might warrant the invocation of an exceptions
clause, and the variety in the consequences that might follow from the
application of such a clause.

145. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Draft Convention on
the Protection of Foreign Property art. 6, Oct. 12, 1967, 7 I.L.M. 117 (1968).
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B. Recent Developments in Exceptions Clauses
Some States have used the same techniques as the US in
developing recent exceptions clauses, namely the use of self-judging
language and the inclusion of fact-specific exceptions clauses for
financial emergencies and environmental disasters. Other States have
employed alternative techniques in exceptions clauses, including the
establishment of a clear hierarchy among the States’ interests that
give rise to an exception, reporting requirements among treaty parties
for suspension of investment protections, and a diversity of
consequences for the suspending State depending on the gravity of the
interest protected in the exceptions clause. One of the most important
aspects of other States’ recent exceptions clauses, however, is their
coherence within the treaty itself. To illustrate this coherence of
exceptions within a single clause, this section presents exceptions
clauses in their entirety from the most relevant treaties and model
treaties.
1. The UK 2008 Model IPPA
The UK 2008 Model Investment Promotion and Protection
Agreement (“IPPA”) contains—in one article, called “Exceptions”—
both a general exceptions provision that provides national treatment
or MFN treatment in undefined emergencies, and also a specific
exceptions provision for times of financial emergency. As this
provision states:
(1) The provisions of this Agreement relative to the grant of
treatment not less favourable than that accorded to the nationals
or companies of either Contracting Party or any third State shall
not be construed as to preclude the adoption or enforcement by a
Contracting party of measures which are necessary to protect
national security, public security or public order . . . .
(2) Where, in exceptional circumstances, payments and capital
movements between the Contracting Parties threaten to cause
serious difficulties for the operation of monetary policy or
exchange rate policy in either Contracting Party, the Contracting
Party concerned may take safeguard measures with regard to
capital movements if such measures are strictly necessary. The
Contracting Party adopting the safeguard measures shall inform
the other Contracting Party forthwith and present, as soon as
possible, a time schedule for their removal.146
146. United Kingdom Model Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement art. 7 (2),
2008 [hereinafter IPPA].
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The first paragraph quoted above preserves the ability of the
British government to block certain mergers under the Enterprise Act
of 2002, and to send matters to review by a compensation
commission.147 This provision appears to provide significant freedom
of action in the establishment phase of the investment, but does little
to protect freedom of action once that investment has been made.148
The second paragraph of this exceptions provision appears to
have been added to the Model IPPA in 2006,149 thus even before the
financial crisis of 2008. This paragraph includes a reporting
requirement for the State taking measures to address threats to its
monetary or exchange rate policy. This reporting requirement likely
serves to discourage frivolous or after-the-fact invocations of this
provision, made only after an investment arbitration has been
initiated. Seemingly, with this reporting requirement, if a State did not
inform its treaty partner of the measure within a reasonable time of
taking the steps in question, then the State did not actually intend for
those measures to be deemed within the financial portion of this
“Exceptions” provision.
This “Exceptions” provision in the UK Model IPPA is combined
with a separate “Compensation for Losses” provision, which
essentially provides for national treatment during times of war,
national emergency, or similar circumstances:
(1) Nationals of companies of one Contracting Party whose
investments in the territory of the other Contracting Party suffer
losses owing to war or other armed conflict, revolution, a state of
national emergency, revolt, insurrection or riot in the territory of
the latter Contracting Party shall be accorded by the latter
Contracting Party treatment, as regards restitution,
indemnification, compensation or other settlement, no less
favourable than that which the latter Contracting Party accords to
its own nationals or companies or to its nationals or companies of
any third State. Restitution payments shall be freely transferrable.
(2) Without prejudice to paragraph (1) of this Article, nationals
or companies of one Contracting Party who in any of the

147. Chester Brown & Audley Sheppard, United Kingdom, in COMMENTARIES ON
SELECTED MODEL BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES 697, 742 (Chester Brown ed., 2013)
(discussing the development of this article of the UK Model IPPA and recent treaties in which
the article’s various provisions are included).
148. Id.
149. Id.
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situations referred to in that paragraph suffer losses in the
territory of the other Contracting Party resulting from
(a) requisitioning of their property by its forces or
authorities, or
(b) destruction of their property by its forces or authorities,
which was not caused in combat action or was not required
by the necessity of the situation, shall be accorded
restitution or adequate compensation. Resulting payments
shall be freely transferrable.150

When combined, the “Exceptions” and “Compensation for
Losses” provisions of the 2008 UK Model IPPA provide a semblance
of hierarchy of interests that might be invoked to justify an exception
from investment treaty protections. Under the “Compensation For
Losses” provision, for example, in a war, national emergency, or
similar circumstances, foreign investors would receive essentially
national treatment. The investor would not, however, be guaranteed
fair and equitable treatment, full protection and security, or other
particular protections provided in investment treaties. Environmental
emergencies, however, do not warrant such a downgrade in investor
protection, at least according to a plain reading of the clause. Such a
difference in the treatment of these two interests appears to indicate
that war is a more serious “interest” that therefore warrants a broader
exception to investment protection than an environmental emergency.
In addition, the financial security provision in the
“Exceptions” clause of the UK Model IPPA, as noted above, ensures
that some leeway in treaty protections is available during times of
economic crisis. The reporting requirement of that clause serves to
limit the invocation of the clause and discourages after-the-fact
invocations of the clause. In addition, the clause itself is limited so
that even with a contemporaneous notification, the exception will
only apply in “exceptional circumstances” causing “serious
difficulties” and will protect only measures that are “strictly
necessary.” Although this provision is not as detailed as the financial
security provision in the 2012 US Model BIT, it does demonstrate
that more than one State is concerned about the application of an
investment treaty during times of financial crisis.151
150. IPPA, supra note 146, at art. 4.
151. Indeed, the Iceland-Mexico BIT also contains a specific clause relating to financial
emergencies.
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Although the 2008 UK Model IPPA exceptions provisions
demonstrate some consideration of potential emergency situations,
these provisions are not entirely foolproof. Like the relationship
between the three separate exceptions provisions in the 2012 US
Model BIT, the relationship between the “Exceptions” and
“Compensation for Losses” provisions of the 2008 UK Model IPPA is
unclear. Moreover, while the “Exceptions” provision appears to
provide a great deal of protection to the host State’s freedom of action
in permitting or forbidding the establishment of an investment, that
protection does not continue throughout the life of an investment.
Such short-lived freedom of action is unlikely to prove adequate to
ensure a long-term balance of regulatory freedom with investment
protection—indeed, such a provision would encourage the host State
to be parsimonious in permitting the establishment of investments,
because after the investment is established, the “balance” is shifted to
the investor, and the host State can no longer regulate with a
reasonable degree of sovereignty. Thus, although the UK Model IPPA
offers some guidance on the structuring of exceptions clauses,
particularly as to the use of reporting requirements, the UK approach
does not necessarily warrant wholesale adoption.
2. The Latvian Model Treaty
A clearer hierarchy of interests is set forth in Article 13 of the
Latvian Model BIT. This provision distinguishes logically between
the consequences of war, as opposed to other aspects of public order
or health. As this provision states:
1. Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed as preventing a
Contracting Party from taking any action necessary for the
protection of its essential security interests in time of war or
armed conflict, or other emergency in international relations.
2. Provided that such measures are not applied in an arbitrary or
unjustifiable manner, or do not constitute a disguised restriction
on international trade or investment, nothing in this Agreement
shall be construed to prevent a Contracting Party from adopting
or maintaining measures, including environmental measures:
(a) Necessary for the maintenance of public order;
(b) Necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or
health.
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3. The provisions of this Article shall not apply to Article 5
[Expropriation], Article 6 [Compensation for losses] or paragraph
1(e) of Article 7 [payments pursuant to Articles 5 & 6] of this
Agreement.

Under this provision, the hierarchy of exceptions norms is as
follows: If a measure is necessary to protect essential security
interests in a time of war or armed conflict, then the agreement’s
protections generally fall away. If the measure is necessary to
maintain public order only, however, the measure must meet a higher
standard—the measure must not be applied “in an arbitrary or
unjustifiable manner” and must “not constitute a disguised restriction
on international trade or investment.”152 Thus, as is logical from the
history of necessity clauses, the Latvian Model treaty provision grants
a State more freedom of action in responding to war than in
responding to other types of emergencies.
In addition, this model provision demonstrates the consequences
of measures that fall within each part of this provision—the investor
will still receive damages for actions that constitute expropriation, but
not for other potential violations of the treaty, such as a failure to
grant fair and equitable treatment or a violation of full protection and
security. Thus, although the State has greater freedom of action in
response to a war as opposed to another type of emergency, the
financial consequences to the State will be the same regardless of the
type of interest invoked.
A potential weakness of this article, however, is its failure to
include a provision specific to a financial emergency, and thus the
failure to provide guidance on the consequences of such an
emergency. The uniqueness of responses to a financial emergency—
and the increasing need to preserve freedom of action in that area—
perhaps warrants the inclusion of a subject-matter specific provision
to that effect in every investment treaty. For this Latvian provision,
financial security measures would be protected only if considered part
of the “maintenance of public order.” Despite this flaw, the Latvian
Model BIT provides helpful guidance for the US and other States
examining their exceptions clauses, particularly in its clear
establishment of a hierarchy of interests and discussion of the
consequences of invoking an emergency exception.

152. Latvian Model BIT art. 13.
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3. Japan-Korea BIT
A final example of forward-thinking exceptions clauses in global
BIT practice is in the Korea-Japan BIT of 2003. Like the US Model
BIT, this exceptions provision includes self-judging language. Like
the Latvian BIT, it also sets out a clear hierarchy of interests that
might warrant invocation of the exceptions clause. In addition, this
provision contains a specific reference to environmental measures,
reference to public order, and a reporting requirement. As the
provision states:
1. Notwithstanding any other provisions in this Agreement other
than the provisions of Article 11, each Contracting Party may:
(a) take any measure which it considers necessary for the
protection of its essential security interests;
(i) taken in time of war, or armed conflict, or other
emergency in that Contracting Party or in international
relations; or
(ii) relating to the implementation of national policies or
international agreements respecting the non-proliferation of
weapons;
(b) take any measure in pursuance of its obligations under the
United Nations Charter for the maintenance of international
peace and security;
(c) take any measure necessary to protect human, animal or plant
life or health; or
(d) take any measure necessary for the maintenance of public
order. The public order exceptions may be invoked only where a
genuine and sufficiently serious threat is posed to one of the
fundamental interests of society.
2. In cases where a Contracting Party takes any measure,
pursuant to paragraph 1 above, that does not conform with the
obligations of the provisions of this Agreement other than the
provisions of Article 11, that Contracting Party shall not use such
measure as a means of avoiding its obligations.
3. In cases where a Contracting Party takes any measure,
pursuant to paragraph 1 above, that does not conform with the
obligations of the provisions of this Agreement other than the
provisions of Article 11, that Contracting Party shall, prior to the
entry into force of the measure or as soon thereafter as possible,
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notify the other Contracting Party of the following elements of
the measure:
(a) sector and sub-sector or matter;
(b) obligation or article in respect of which the measure is taken;
(c) legal source or authority of the measure;
(d) succinct description of the measure; and
(e) motivation or purpose of the measure.

This provision has two innovative elements that combine to
make it an extremely effective exceptions clause. First, the clause sets
out examples of interests that might concern a State’s “essential
security” that serve confine the term to matters related to war. By so
limiting the definition of “essential security,” the self-judging
language in this provision of the Japan-Korea BIT becomes more
palatable to the international community because, although the selfjudging language might permit broad freedom of action, the ability to
so act would apply only in limited factual circumstances, i.e., in a
war.
The second innovative element of this provision is its detailed
notification requirement in Section 3 quoted above. A bare-bones
notification provision, such as the one included in the 2008 UK
Model IPPA, serves a general purpose of discouraging after-the-fact
invocations of the clause. The more detailed requirement of the
Japan-Korea BIT, however, serves additional purposes. By requiring
the host-State to specify the sector and sub-sector in which the
measure is taken, the notification requirement gives the host-State the
incentive to limit the scope of the measure in question to that which is
strictly necessary to address the emergency. By requiring the State to
identify the legal source of the measure taken, this notification
requirement helps ensure that the State will not violate its own law in
taking measures in response to an emergency, thus providing greater
predictability for investors. Finally, by requiring that the State note
the obligation or article with respect to which the measure is taken,
this notification requirement allows the host State to choose for itself
the consequences of its emergency measures—for example, the State
can notify its treaty partner that a certain measure will be excepted
from all substantive obligations of the treaty except national
treatment, or that only protection against expropriation will apply. By
forcing the State to choose the consequences of its emergency
measure, this notification requirement allows nuance for States
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seeking to balance the ability to address emergency situations, while
still retaining protection of investors.
A potential weakness of the exceptions clause in the JapanKorea BIT is that it may be too permissive for the host State. This
clause is phrased in positive terms—“each contracting party may”
take certain measures—as opposed to the general practice of phrasing
an emergency exception in negative terms—a measure in derogation
may be taken “only if” or “Nothing in this agreement shall be
construed to preclude.” Phrasing the emergency provision in such
permissive language makes that clause not so much an exception, but
more like a limiting clause to the treaty’s protection, and could
discourage investment due to the breadth of freedom allowed to the
host State at the expense of protection of investment.
C. Conclusions and Themes from Comparative Analysis
As the above-quoted comparative examples demonstrate,
States have long been careful to preserve their freedom of action as a
general matter in investment treaties. In recent years, States have also
sought to specifically preserve their freedom to act in response to
environmental disasters and financial disasters, as well as in times of
war or revolution or public emergency. States have accordingly
included fact-specific exceptions clauses in their investment treaties,
and also expanded the language of general exceptions clauses to
preserve an exit to treaty requirements during emergencies of
unanticipated types. Despite expanding their freedom of action, States
have maintained their commitment to investment protection by
requiring notice to treaty parties when an exceptions clause is invoked
and by offering at least limited compensation to the investors
affected.
Recent global investment treaty practice presents three themes
that could serve as guidance in the future US-China BIT, or in other
US BITs. First, States generally permit some compensation for
investment treaty violations, particularly when the measure causing
the violation was in response to something less than war or
revolution. Such a result is logical, given that, under the general
hierarchy of interests that might give rise to an emergency exception,
an environmental or financial disaster is seen as less of a threat to the
existence of a State than a war.
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A second theme from this comparative analysis, which could
serve as a guide the US-China BIT negotiations, is the use of
reporting or notification requirements to preserve investor protections
in times of emergency. Reporting or notification serves as a form of
restraint, and helps to prevent after-the-fact attempts to justify certain
action based on imagined or manufactured concern for the
environment, financial hardship, or other seemingly-legitimate
circumstances. Such a reporting requirement, and the use of reporting,
would have an effect that was exactly the opposite of a self-judging
clause—rather than undermining the legitimacy of the plea because of
its unmoored nature, the reporting requirement serves to support the
legitimacy of a plea under one of these clauses by establishing the
host State’s reliance on that clause from an early date. A detailed
reporting requirement, such as the one included in the Japan-Korea
BIT may be the most useful because it requires the State to consider
the scope and effect of its actions.
Finally, the United States and China could observe other States’
differentiation of the consequences that flow from the invocation of
differing interests as the source of the emergency. For the most
significant interests which obviously threaten the existence of the
State most seriously—such as responding to war—it may be that no
investment protections apply. For other interests, where the threat to
the existence of the State is less palpable, national treatment
protections might apply or expropriation alone might remain
prohibited. The establishment of clear and differentiated
consequences for these different types of emergencies allows both
States and investors to appreciate the status of an investment during a
crisis of various types, and allows them to plan and balance the
treaty’s goals.
These three lessons lead to a logical proposal for alternative
language for a potential emergency clause of the forthcoming USChina BIT. Such a proposal, and an explanation for the changes, is
presented in the next section.
IV. THE WAY FORWARD IN US BITS
The foregoing analysis suggests that a well-considered
exceptions clause would include (1) a hierarchy of interests that give
rise to such exceptions; (2) a clear statement of the consequences of
measures that fall within the exceptions clause; and (3) a requirement
of timely notice by the host State to its treaty partner of any measure
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taken in response to an emergency. Incorporating these three
characteristics, the US-China BIT might include a clause along the
lines of the following:
Art ###. Exceptions.
(1) Nothing in this treaty shall be construed to preclude a Party
from taking
(a) measures it considers necessary for the fulfillment of its
obligations with respect to the maintenance or restoration of
international peace or security, or the protection of its own
essential security interests, such as measures
(i) taken in time of war, or armed conflict, or other
emergency in that Contracting Party or in international
relations; or
(ii) relating to the implementation of national policies or
international agreements respecting the non-proliferation of
weapons;
(b) measures necessary to ensure that investment activity in its
territory is undertaken in a manner sensitive to environmental
concerns.
(c) measures relating to financial services undertaken for
prudential reasons, including the protection of investors,
depositors, policy holders, or persons to whom a fiduciary
duty is owed by a financial services supplier, or to ensure the
integrity and stability of the financial system.
(d) measures relating to investors of the other Party, or
covered investments, in financial institutions that are
necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations that
are not inconsistent with this Treaty, including those related to
the prevention of deceptive and fraudulent practices or that
deal with the effects of a default on financial services
contracts.
(2) This provision shall apply in addition to, and independent of
any exceptions in customary international law.
(3) When a Party takes any measure, pursuant to paragraph (1)
above, that Party shall, prior to the entry into force of the
measure or as soon thereafter as possible, notify the other Party
of the following elements of the measure:
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(a) sector and sub-sector or matter;
(b) obligation or article in respect of which the measure is
taken;
(c) legal source or authority of the measure;
(d) succinct description of the measure; and
(e) motivation or purpose of the measure.
(4) If a measure falls within Part (1)(a) of this article, no
compensation shall be due for any action that would be deemed
violation of the treaty, but for the application of this provision.
(5) If a measure falls within Part (1)(b) to (1)(d) of this article,
the investment shall be accorded national treatment.
(6) If a measure falls within Part (1)(c) or (1)(d) of this article,
then the following provisions shall apply
(a) [the 2012 US Model BIT provision that requires
appointment of arbitrators with expertise in financial matters]
(b) [the 2012 US Model BIT provision that allows the finance
ministries of both States’ party to the treaty to agree that the
measure was taken in response to a financial emergency]
(c) [the 2012 US Model BIT provision that allows for
preliminary determination of the application of the financial
services exception]

The text suggested above has several advantages over the
exceptions provisions in the 2012 Model BIT. First, like the Latvian
Model BIT, the suggested text sets out a clear hierarchy of interests
that might warrant departure from the treaty norms, and—at parts (4)
and (5)—defines the various consequences of invoking the exceptions
clause. Like the 2008 UK Model IPPA, the clause provides for
national treatment for all types of emergencies except war. The clause
also includes a detailed notification requirement, like the Japan-Korea
BIT, which will require the host State to consider the effects and
scope of the measure it is taking. The suggested text retains the selfjudging language for the essential security provision at part (1)(a), but
like the Japan-Korea BIT, it includes language that clearly limits this
essential security provision to time of war, when self-judgment would
be most appropriate and least likely to unduly compromise investment
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protection and cause concern among treaty partners. In addition, the
text suggested above retains the extremely well-considered procedural
provisions of the “Financial Services” provision of the 2012 Model
BIT, and it includes a provision that clarifies the relationship—or lack
of relationship—between the treaty provision and any concept of
necessity in customary international law. Finally, the suggested text
eliminates the ambiguous distinction between “measures necessary”
and “measures appropriate” in the context of the environmental
exception by simply applying the “necessary” language to all types of
exceptions.
A clause such as the one suggested above would go a long way
towards clarifying investor-State relations before any arbitrations
arise, thus giving certainty to the parties’ obligations and leaving less
to the whims of arbitral tribunals. In the US-China context, where the
stakes are billions in investment and potentially billions in investment
arbitration awards, clarity and certainty in treaty-drafting is required.
CONCLUSION
The forthcoming US-China BIT will spark not only new
investment, but also new investment arbitration. Both States should
prepare for this eventuality, and include in their treaty a sensible,
practical exceptions provision that preserves the host State’s freedom
of action, while balancing protection of investment. A comparative
analysis of exceptions clauses in global BIT practice provides one
pathway toward the framing of such a provision.
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